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“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” 
- Theodosius Dobzhansky, 
American Biology Teacher (1973) 
 
 
“It has been said that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution. It can now also be said that nothing in human behavior makes sense 
except in that same light. Cast it on ourselves, and we find that human nature is 
real, definable, and to some extent predictable.” 
- Melvin Konner,  
The Tangled Wing (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	1			 	 	 	 	
	
 
Table	of	Contents	Acknowledgements	...................................................................................................................................	2	Preface	............................................................................................................................................................	4	Introduction		................................................................................................................................................	9	
	
Section	1:	Evolutionary	Psychology	Defined	........................................................................................	15	Defining	the	Process	.........................................................................................................................................	15	Health	and	the	Evolved	Body	........................................................................................................................	23	Building	Evolutionary	Ideas	..........................................................................................................................	28	Evolutionary	Psychology	................................................................................................................................	32	Relevant	Criticism	..............................................................................................................................................	36		
Section	2:	Evolution	and	the	Social	Sciences	........................................................................................	42	A	Political	Animal	in	the	Modern	World	..................................................................................................	42	A	Social	Advantage	............................................................................................................................................	43	Coalitions	and	Mass	Politics	..........................................................................................................................	49	Status,	Reputation,	and	Conditional	Cooperation	................................................................................	56	Understanding	Irrationality	..........................................................................................................................	60	
	
Section	3:	Shining	a	Light	on	Inequality	..................................................................................................	66	Inequality	and	Evolutionary	Psychology	.................................................................................................	66	Life	History	Theory	...........................................................................................................................................	67	Welfare	Policy	and	Evolved	Influences	.....................................................................................................	71	Status	Centered	Development?	....................................................................................................................	74	
	
Conclusion:	Applications	and	Constraints	.............................................................................................	77	Descriptive	Value	and	Causal	Understanding	........................................................................................	78	Prescriptive	Utility	.............................................................................................................................................	81	Normative	Limits	................................................................................................................................................	83	Concluding	Thoughts	........................................................................................................................................	89	Works	Cited	................................................................................................................................................	92		 	
 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	2			 	 	 	 	
	
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I am immensely privileged to have completed a project of this magnitude 
as an undergraduate. The Honor Scholar Thesis has provided an outlet for 
expressing my academic voice and for this I am extremely grateful. This thesis 
would not have been possible without the dedicated faculty and staff that make 
the Honor Scholar program possible. My thanks goes out to Associate Director 
Amy Welch and Program Secretary Peg Lemley for their work in organizing the 
thesis process.  
I would like to thank Professor of Political Science Deepa Prakash for her 
seemingly endless commitment of time, energy, and advice. I am extremely lucky 
to call such a brilliant, generous person my friend and mentor. Thank you to 
Professor Brett O’Bannon, my academic advisor, for inspiring me to choose 
political science as my undergraduate major. Additional, I am grateful for the time 
and expertise of Professor Jeffery Dunn of the Philosophy Department, who 
participated in my thesis defense.  
This project would not exist without the encouragement of Dr. Kevin 
Moore, Professor of Psychology and Director of the Honor Scholar Program. His 
course, Evolution and Human Nature, captured my intellectual imagination and 
provided the initial spark for the ideas expressed in this thesis. He has been 
instrumental in providing advice, edits, and conceptual clarification at every step 
in the thesis process. Studying applied evolution is an intensely personal 
experience, as it forces confrontation with deep-seeded beliefs about religion, 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	3			 	 	 	 	
	
purpose, and meaning. The complexity of the subject requires a skillful, nuanced 
approach. I am grateful to have had such an outstanding educator to guide me 
down this path.  
I am especially grateful to the political scientists, psychologists, 
sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and evolutionary scientists whose work 
I draw on throughout this endeavor. My project owes everything to the efforts of 
these individuals. Additionally, I deeply respect the committed scholars of my 
generation who have chosen to make these questions their life’s work. I admire 
your unrelenting devotion to the pursuit of truth.  
 Thank you to my loving parents, John and Sherrie Burger, who have made 
incredible sacrifices so that I can pursue my dreams. Everything I am, I am 
because of you.
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	4			 	 	 	 	
	
Preface 
 
During the first semester of my junior year, my intellectual life was 
infiltrated by a magnificently simple, yet overwhelmingly powerful idea: the theory 
of evolution. Of course, I had learned about evolution in high school. I memorized 
the terminology, studied the phylogenetic tree, and read about Darwin sailing the 
Beagle to the Galapagos to look at finches - or was it tortoises? Clearly, this was 
not an expansive or comprehensive view of evolutionary theory, this was the 
study of evolution by name alone. The superficiality of my evolutionary education 
was shattered after I enrolled in a course entitled Evolution and Human Nature. 
This transcendent intellectual experience transformed evolution from an 
interesting biological fact into a pervasive influence on how I see the world. 
Socialized patterns of gender discrepancies, male propensity for violence, out-
group oriented xenophobia, selfishness, altruism, and social cohesion all became 
irreversibly enlightened by the study of our evolutionary past. It was as if a veil 
had been lifted, exposing me to the intensely organic character of my human 
identity. 
In the midst of this personal renaissance, I sought out ways to apply an 
evolutionary perspective to the issues I was studying in political science. I saw 
evolutionary theory as an indispensable supplement to the social sciences. 
History is often touted as an essential tool for examining social phenomena, so 
how could I ignore the impact of four billion years of history in the form of natural 
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selection? I felt like Charley in an intellectual chocolate factory, and evolutionary 
psychology was my golden ticket.  
As this course progressed, I began to bridge more and more parallels 
between our evolved identity and social behavior. Political science lacks the 
satisfaction of absolute truths, as the complexity of social behavior often escapes 
irrefutable theory. I looked to the empirical refuge of the natural sciences as a 
source of somewhat more reliable predictions and conclusions about human 
nature and the ubiquities of human action. I found myself trying to approach the 
problem in a way that clarified the raw material, the human element, of political 
science.  
I was utterly confused at why I hadn’t been exposed to these ideas before. 
I remember thinking one day that social scientists must just take evolution as a 
given. It may be such a big idea, present in such overwhelming proportion, that it 
was simply outside the scope of more precise scholarship. “Of course evolution 
matters, now let me tell you about the impact of Citizens United on campaign 
financing.” This is a fair assertion, because not every conversation warrants an 
evolutionary reference. What I found absolutely astounding, inexplicable really, 
was that my search for interdisciplinary research between evolutionary theory 
and political science turned up almost nothing of prominence. In fact, a 
substantial amount of scholarship was actually arguing against integrating an 
evolutionary perspective into the social sciences!  
My three-way honeymoon with evolutionary theory and political science 
was over before I even opened the first bottle of champagne. As I began to read 
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more and more about the intersection of biology and politics, my initial 
enthusiasm began to simmer down. Social constructivists prodded me to ponder, 
where is culture in all of this? An atrocious history of biological determinism, 
eugenics, and Social Darwinism made me wonder if I was just playing with fire, 
soon to be burnt by ideas that I found morally repulsive. I began to sympathize 
with the hesitation. Ideas have power, and beliefs about the political world are 
uniquely consequential. Despite this much-needed caution, I still believed that to 
ignore the vastness of our evolutionary past was to overlook the inescapable 
reality of the present. I climbed down from a zealous pulpit and began to rebuild 
my evolutionary creed.  
This thesis is in many ways a reflection on my intellectual journey over the 
past two years. This is a deeply personal undertaking, and it is worth noting that I 
am still struggling to define my personal philosophy in relation to these issues. I 
am drawn to these sorts of questions because they allow me to “see the forest 
for the trees,” and provide an exciting exercise in tying the currents of history, 
culture, power, and identity to the socio-political present. To me, there is no 
greater endeavor than the search for social truth, even if no such thing exists. 
Building off this intimate motivation, my aim is to reach out to those that 
are skeptical of integrating evolutionary theory into the social sciences. The roots 
of this ambition can be traced to my commitment to the pervasiveness of 
evolution and my continued love of political science research. My primarily 
objective is to create a source of interdisciplinary dialogue by highlighting the 
potential relevance of evolutionary approaches and perspectives to social inquiry.  
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I also want to present an account of one approach - evolutionary 
psychology - that breaks down existing stereotypes about the evolutionary 
sciences. I specifically hope to present a version of evolutionary psychology that 
deadens the ever-present critique that evolutionary theory does not account for 
the influence and importance of culture. I argue that we are social beings who 
have evolved highly sensitive, complex, and context specific psychological 
mechanisms for navigating the social world. I want to show that genetic 
determinism is not intrinsic to the evolutionary perspective. Additionally, 
evolutionary psychology tells us something about the influence of psychological 
mechanisms in affecting human behavior, but it does not give way to normative 
answers or a naturalistic moral system.  
Despite these limitations, this paper does argue that the study of social 
institutions, cultural practices, and individual behavior can be critically informed 
by the light of evolutionary theory. Evolution tells us something profound about 
who we are, and guides our ability to make determinations on how social 
conditions and political institutions interact with the psychological mechanisms 
that affect social and political behavior. I go about this goal by clarifying 
evolutionary concepts, pointing out possible avenues of exploration, and 
constructing a preliminary framework for understanding the epistemological utility 
of evolutionary psychology.  
 This thesis is guided by certain fundamental questions. What can we learn 
from our evolved nature? How can we use this in understanding political behavior 
and social context? What are the limits of using evolution to bring about the world 
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in which we wish to live? In short, the audience I wish to reach are those 
concerned with the same sincere questions that Paul Gauguin asked in the title 
of his post-impressionist musing on sorrow, death, and the meaning of life: 
Where do we come from? What are we? Where are we going? 
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Introduction 
 
To take evolution to be true is to concede our biological existence to the 
power of a singular idea. This is a terrifying proposition, as it challenges the 
ethical and cultural foundations on which we have traditionally constructed social 
discourse. Evolutionary science implies the existence of “human nature,” as it 
tells us something about the ubiquitous character of emotion, reason, and 
behavior. This is a cause of much concern. In the realm of the social sciences, 
“Darwin’s Dangerous Idea” has been mostly excluded in mainstream social 
discourse, and if included it is almost universally rejected as being irrelevant to 
the study of social behavior. [1] 
What is perplexing about this rejection is that political science has a long 
and storied philosophical history of searching for human nature. For millennia, 
philosophers have sought to define the fixed terms of the human experience. 
Plato arduously constructed his version of the perfectly “just” political entity by 
dividing its members according to their natural capacities, entrenching class 
associated determinism into his normative vision. [2] In the 16th century, Thomas 
Hobbes tried his hand at solidifying the legtimacy of monarchical government by 
articulating his vision of man in the State of Nature, a primal period antecedent to 
the societal institutions of the state. [3] From Hobbes’ unsettling conclusion that 
life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” to Rousseau’s fantasy of the 																																																								
1 Dennet, D. (1995) Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. Simon & 
Schuster.  
2 Plato. The Republic. Jowett, B. (1941) New York: The Modern Library. 
3 Hobbes, Thomas. (1651) Leviathan or the matter, forme, and power of a common wealth 
ecclesiasticall and civil. 
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“noble savage,” political theorists have sought to uncover what makes human 
beings ubiquitously human. [4] Additionally, these works are an integral part of 
any basic education in political theory. If the prevalence of these works is taken 
to be an indication of their importance within the discipline, then consensus 
suggests that reading authors like Hobbes and Rousseau is a valuable 
undertaking – if only to point out the folly of their ways. Political scientists are apt 
to struggle against the essentialists of the past, but many reject an exchange with 
a scientific account of human nature in the present.  
Appearing at the chronological midpoint between Thomas Hobbes and the 
modern day, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species introduced evolution by 
natural selection. This beautifully simple, yet explosively universal idea would 
bring about a revolution in how we think about our organic identity. Evolutionary 
theory provides us with the only scientifically tenable explanation of the origins of 
humankind, making this secular revelation one of the greatest discoveries in the 
history of humanity. Evolution is the foundation of the life sciences, but it is 
disproportionately underutilized outside of the biological sciences. [5] From the 
very beginning, Darwinian approaches stimulated intense debate about how to 
reconcile a naturalistic origin of humanity with the established traditions of 
Western philosophy, religion, and the humanities. [6] One hundred and fifty years 
later we are still struggling to grapple with our evolved identity in relation to 
culture, political power, and social forces.  																																																								
4 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, (1754) Discourse on Inequality.  
5 Public's Views on Human Evolution. Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project . N.p., 
30 Dec. 2013. Web. 14 Apr. 
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 The intersection of biology and social behavior came into contemporary 
focus with E.O. Wilson’s 1975 publication Sociobiology, a book that would lend 
its name to an entirely new field of behavioral sciences. [7] Wilson’s book set out 
to examine social behavior through an evolutionary lens, using natural selection 
to explain contemporary behavioral patterns. His groundbreaking work was 
praised by some as a new paradigm for social research. These initial 
evolutionary apologists proclaimed evolution to be a panacea for simplifying the 
complexity of human behavior, with some calling for a revolution within the social 
sciences. [8] Many of these naturalists heralded an empirical replacement for the 
ungrounded philosophical abstractions that had long formed the theoretical basis 
of social science.  
Conversely, critics accused Wilson of biological determinism and likened 
his conclusions to the horrors of Social Darwinism and eugenics. Many advanced 
a “blank slate” conception of the mind. This view asserts a position similar to 
Locke’s view of the overriding centrality of experience and culture, along with an 
implicit (or on occasion, explicit) acceptance of a view akin to Cartesian Dualism, 
in which the mind exists separately from the neurological structures of the brain. 
In the field of applied evolution, the idea that the mind contains no predetermined 
mechanisms for behavior is commonly referred to as the Standard Social 
																																																								
7 Wilson, E. O. (1975) Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University 
Press. 
8 Barkow, J. (Eds.) (2006) Missing the Revolution: Darwinism for social scientists. New York, NY. 
Oxford University Press.  
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Science Model (SSSM). [9] This critique stems from the deep-seated resentment 
of any notion of a human nature in 20th century social science literature. This 
argument claims that all behavior is determined by social and cultural conditions, 
and there exist no innate tendencies that affect action and individual choice. One 
example of this backlash was the 1986 adoption of the UNESCO Seville 
Statement on Violence, which rejected “the notion that organized human violence 
is biologically determined.” [10] It should be noted that the SSSM in some ways 
oversimplifies the mainstream tenets of the discipline. But this term proves to be 
a useful heuristic device in tracing historical objections to the existence of a 
biological “human nature.” 
 This thesis will argue that both the SSSM and an approach that cedes too 
much to genetic determinism are mistaken. As Steven Pinker writes in his much-
cited critique of the blank slate paradigm, “the main problem is that the blank 
slates don’t do anything. No one can deny the central importance of learning, 
cultural, and socialization in all aspects of the human experience. The question 
is, how do they work.” [11] I will present evidence that attempts to provide an 
incremental step in the long and tedious journey of finding answers to this 
question. There are valuable lessons to be learned by integrating knowledge and 
perspectives from the natural sciences to the study of social behavior.  
 In addition, I want to show that although the social sciences could be 
greatly informed by the evolutionary perspective, their approach is not discredited 																																																								
9 Barkow, J., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J., (1992) The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and 
the generation of culture. Oxford University Press.  
10 Pinker, S. (1997) How the Mind Works. W. W. Norton & Company, p. 44 and 49 
11 Pinker, S. (2003) The blank slate: the modern denial of human nature. Penguin Books. 
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by it. Understanding social influence requires investigation at another level, a 
cultural and social level. Also, evolution ultimately cannot (and should not) 
provide normative answers to the structure of social policy. To see ourselves as 
a product of evolution is to break down the established divide in separating 
humanity from the natural world, sparking questions concerning our purpose, our 
future, and the essence of our soul. However, evolution’s unceasing disruption of 
traditional notions of human identity does not lead us to conclusions about what 
sort of society we want to become. My conclusion preserves the value of 
conventional social science while calling for a more integrated approach.  
As the field of sociobiology matured, new ways of conceptualizing the 
evolutionary mechanisms of consciousness and behavior, alongside 
developments in cognitive science and neuroscience, crafted the subfield of 
evolutionary psychology. This approach seeks to use evolutionary theory to 
understand the cognitive, physiological, and emotional mechanisms that 
influence human behavior, and this approach has been largely unexplored and 
underemphasized within mainstream political science literature. There are 
varying approaches and terminology for the application of evolution to human 
behavior, but I have chosen to focus on evolutionary psychology because it 
spans a broad range of theory and research. It is also widely used within the 
relevant literature on applied evolution.  
 Ultimately, this thesis sets out to provide an exploratory synthesis – a pilot 
study or first step, not a conclusive account – of two disciplines: political science 
and evolutionary psychology. First, I will provide background information on 
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relevant principles and processes of evolutionary theory while supplying a 
foundational description of the principles and process of evolutionary psychology. 
The second section introduces the primary concepts of evolutionary theory as 
applied to human behavior, wrestles with critiques and historical misuses, and 
ultimately constructs a more nuanced vision of the utility of evolutionary 
psychology and its application to socio-political phenomena. Third, I ground 
these assertions in a discussion of social inequality, highlighting the unique ability 
of evolutionary psychology to enlighten our understanding of social and political 
behavior in the face of social constraints. The conclusion will develop a 
preliminary framework for conceptualizing the descriptive and normative 
functions of evolutionary theory within political science.  
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Section 1: Evolutionary Psychology Defined 
 
Defining the process 
 
 Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species revolutionized the way that we 
think about life on earth. [12] Delivering more than a simple description of the 
similarities and differences between organisms, Darwin’s work explained the 
mechanism for biological change over time. He sought to understand not just 
how, but why species are so especially suited to their environments. The process 
of natural selection would become the backbone of Darwinian theory, as it 
explains the ever-present forces that have shaped life on earth since it first 
appeared over 3.7 billion years ago.  
 The process of natural selection requires three essential elements. [13] 
The first is variation, meaning that organisms differ in the traits that they possess. 
Without variation, there would be no distinguishing characteristics to differentiate 
fitness outcomes and therefore no disparities in reproductive success. This leads 
to the second element of natural selection, inheritance. This entails that variation 
based on genotypic differences be passed from generation to generation through 
a biological medium (in humans DNA) at differing frequencies. The third pillar of 
natural selection is differential reproduction, in that the inheritable variations have 
consequential effects on an organism’s survival and reproductive success. The 
																																																								
12 Darwin, C. (1854) On the origin of species. 
13 Buss, D. (2015) Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. 5th ed. Pearson 
Education. 
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conditions of life on earth meet all three of these requirements, allowing natural 
selection to act as the primary vehicle by which selection pressures have come 
to craft the vast diversity of life on earth.  
 Despite the immense power of natural selection in shaping adaptive traits 
linked to survival, Darwin realized that it could not account for the entire range of 
variation found in the biological world. After all, how could a peacock’s tail make 
it more suitable to its environment? This extra pomp is metabolically costly and 
seems to provide no obvious benefit to survival. Also, what could possibly explain 
phenotypic differences between males and females if they live in the same 
ecosystem? Why would males and females show any differences if they both 
existed in the same environment of evolution? Understanding the full extent of 
variant traits requires the complementary process of sexual selection. [14] 
 Adaptations resulting from sexual selection are not selected for because 
they are beneficial to an organism’s survival, but because they impact 
reproductive success. There are two complementary components to this theory. 
The first is intersexual competition, or preferential mate choice. If there is a 
consensus between members of one sex regarding desired qualities – such as 
security, resource access, or traits that display overall health – the organisms of 
the opposite sex that exhibit these qualities will have higher reproductive success 
and thus pass these traits on to the next generation in greater proportion. [15] 
This helps to account for the evolution of the peacock’s tail. Studies have shown 
																																																								
14 Darwin, C. (1854) On the origin of species. 
15 Buss, D. (2015) Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. 5th ed. Pearson 
Education. 
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that females prefer males with the largest and most flamboyant tails, probably 
because they signal general good health. The gradual accumulation of 
reproductive advantage of those male peacocks that exhibited the largest, most 
elaborate tails has led to the gradual evolution of their present form. 
 The second facet of sexual selection is intrasexual competition, which 
involves competition between members of the same sex to in order to gain 
access to desired partners. Intrasexual selection accounts for the competitions 
between same-sex organisms as they challenge each other for resources that 
determine reproductive success. Primate research shows that the prevalence of 
aggression in human males is likely a product of intrasexual competition. [16] 
Those males most able to defend their resources, stake claim to assets of others, 
or win status through violence are also those with the highest rates of 
reproductive success. Reproductive inequality between members of the same 
sex slowly selects for traits that prove instrumental in gaining reproductive 
access to a member of the opposite sex.  
 Building on George C. Williams’ Adaption and Natural Selection, David 
Buss describes three products of the evolutionary process: adaptations, by-
products, and evolutionary noise. [17] [18] Elaborating on the differences between 
these elements helps to establish a more nuanced appreciation for how evolution 
has come to shape the characteristics of organisms. First, natural selection 
																																																								
16 Peterson, D. & Wrangham R. (1997) Demonic Males: Apes and the origins of human violence. 
Mariner Books. 
17 Williams, G. C. (1966) Adaption and Natural Selection a critique of some current evolutionary 
thought. Princeton University Press 
18 Buss, D. (2015) Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. 5th ed. Pearson 
Education. 
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brings about adaptations that help to solve problems of survival or reproduction 
existing in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). In order to 
assert that a characteristic is an adaptation, the trait must be shown to be 
reliable, efficient, and economic. Is the trait evident in most members of the 
species and does it reliably perform in the environmental context in which it 
arose? Does the trait solve a particular fitness problem faced by organisms in a 
certain environment? Is the characteristic worth the physiological, reproductive, 
and energy costs required for its development? [19] According to Steven Pinker, 
adaptions are traits with “improbable usefulness,” meaning that these 
characteristics are too precisely in-tune to an adaptive problem to be explained 
by chance alone. [20]  
 If natural selection is the process by which genetic frequency is 
manipulated, what explains the initial emergence of genetic variance that gives 
rise to variant traits? The answer lies in genetic mutations. Although the vast 
majority of mutations provide no adaptive benefit, those few that provide some 
degree of fitness advantage (enhanced probability of survival and reproduction) 
are passed down to subsequent generations with greater frequency. These 
adaptations occur over a period of evolution, which ranges widely based on 
environmental context, trait complexity, and the time at which the initial mutation 
occurred.  
																																																								
19 Williams, G. C. (1966) Adaption and Natural Selection a critique of some current evolutionary 
thought  
20 Pinker, S. (1997) How the mind works. New York, NY: Norton 
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 The Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) “refers to the 
statistical composite of selection pressures that occurred during an adaptation’s 
period of evolution responsible for producing the adaptation.” [21] The EEA is a 
reference to the selection forces, or adaptive conditions, through which 
characteristics arise. This should not be conceptualized as a particular time or 
place, but stretches back into “deep evolutionary time.” EEA is a holistic concept 
that takes into account the progression of environmental forces that have worked 
to shape changes in genetic information over time.  
 Take for example the EEA of the eye, which refers to the entire breadth of 
selection pressures that have come to shape vision structures over hundreds of 
millions of years. The first organisms possessing anything close to what we 
would consider an eye appeared only 550 million years ago. [22] Probably 
beginning as a simple patch of light-sensitive cells, survival advantages and 
incremental selection forces have given rise to the intricate structures of the 
human eye over a protracted timeline of evolutionary adaptedness. [23] As those 
organisms with sharper vision found themselves more apt to avoid predators or 
collect resources, they passed on these traits to the next generation with higher 
frequency as visual organ structures became more and more complex.  
 Despite the “miraculous” intricacy of our optic organ, the eye is far from 
perfect. It is particularly sensitive to damage, developmental deficiencies, and 
degradation from age; and millions of fragile blood vessels stream along the 																																																								
21 Tooby and Cosmides 1992. Psychological foundations of culture. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & 
J. Tooby (eds.) The adapted mind (pp.19-136). New York. Oxford University Press. 
22 Nilsson, Dan-Erik. PBS. Evolution: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. PBS, 2012. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. 
23 Nilsson, Dan-Erik. PBS. Evolution: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. PBS, 2012. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. 
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surface of the eye as opposed to being buried in the protective interior. [24] Far 
from an architect of flawless design, natural selection is a gradual, non-
intentional process that advances in no direction except that determined by 
environmental constraints. Organisms do not foresee their needs and actively 
work to evolve a beneficial trait. Rather, the process of selection occurs because 
of the marginal advantage provided by a certain beneficial trait. These changes 
are incremental, occurring in steps from generation to generation.  
 Giraffes did not look to leaves in the top of the trees and decide that it 
would be advantageous to have long necks to reach higher leaves. Rather, the 
accumulation of the relative advantage of those with higher necks led to the 
gradual and unintended development of long necks because those with a fitness 
advantage (greater access to food that provided advantages that outweighed the 
costs associated with changes in neck length and structure) were able to more 
effectively pass these traits to the next generation. Evolution is not the “survival 
of the fittest,” but the “survival of the fitter.” This is to say that evolution in no way 
progresses towards perfection, as the forces that shape organismal development 
are blindly dependent on the environment pressures that have constrained life 
since the beginning of time.  
 The EEA can be easily misinterpreted, especially in the context of human 
evolution. The origins of our biological composition stretch back into deep 
evolutionary time, but when considering a number of factors that distinguish 
humanity from other species, one important frame of reference for EEA involves 
																																																								
24 Nilsson, Dan-Erik. PBS. Evolution: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. PBS, 2012. Web. 10 Apr. 2016. 
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small-scale, social groups of hunter-gatherers. Humans have spent 99% of our 
(human) evolutionary history in these micro-societies. [25] As a result, our 
characteristics as a species have likely been profoundly shaped by the 
environmental pressures of hunter-gatherer life. Evolutionary psychology and 
related fields draw on this setting as an important component of many predictive 
theories. We can suspect that traits that would have been advantageous in this 
context would be traits that we see in humankind today. This stems from the 
sheer proportion of time Homo sapiens spent adapting to this environment. We 
can piece together an image of what life was like in hunter-gatherer societies 
through direct and indirect evidence. “Key elements of the ancestral environment 
of humans can be accurately described by reference to [existing] hunter-gatherer 
societies, paleontological findings, and comparative studies of our closest 
primate relatives.” [26] Despite our knowledge of our hunter-gatherer identity, 
short-term environments would have been constantly changing and it is 
extraordinarily difficult to pinpoint an exact timeframe for the Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptedness of a specific trait. 
 Along with adaptations, the second product of evolution are by–products. 
These characteristics do not solve an adaptive problem, but are “carried along” 
with traits that have adaptive utility. By-products “happen to be coupled with 
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those adaptations” and thus become common in a species. [27] Some critics 
accuse evolutionary psychology of overemphasizing the adaptational utility of 
psychological mechanism. This accusation of panadaptationalism stems from the 
incorrect assumption that if some cognitive mechanisms are the result of 
adaptions, then all facets of human behavior must be associated with some 
evolutionary advantage. [28] 
 This critique is often raised in the debate concerning male violence, 
especially sexual violence. Opponents of an evolutionary explanation for male 
violence assert that evolutionary psychology justifies rape and sexual assault by 
determining these acts to be “naturally” advantageous. However, Thornhill and 
Palmer have shown that sexual violence may very well be an atrocious and 
maladaptive by-product of male aggression and sexual desire. [29] The normative 
nuance of evolutionary theory will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3, but 
it is still important to note that pointing out the evolutionary origins of a certain 
behavior in no way justifies that act. 
 The final product of natural selection can be described as evolutionary 
noise. These traits arise due to the random effects of chance mutations and 
developmental processes. These are characteristics that have not been selected 
for or selected against, and result from physical structural constraints, or more or 
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less coincidental genetic transfer at high frequencies. Another form of 
evolutionary noise derives from developmental processes. The shape of the belly 
button serves no adaptive function, but exists dues to its indirect connection to a 
critical developmental stage. Evolutionary noise can be said to occur at the fringe 
of natural selection, arising without a direct role in resolving an adaptive hurdle. 
 
Health and the Evolved Body  
  
 The process of evolution has created both body and mind. The 
physiological interactions we have with the environment are intuitively 
discernable; we touch, we sing, we feel pain. The flesh and bone of our corporal 
existence seem unavoidably biological. The mind is not so readily linked with the 
natural, although it is just as much a function of biology as any other feature. The 
following discourse will examine the dysevolutionary mismatch between physical 
health and modern society to provide an argument by analogy for pursuing an 
investigation of the relationship between evolved psychological mechanisms and 
contemporary socio-political behavior.  
 In The Story of the Human Body, evolutionary biologist Daniel Lieberman 
discusses the paradoxical condition of health in the modern world. Lieberman 
argues that in many ways we live in the healthiest period of human existence, as 
wealthy nations usher in an unsurpassed era of public health by capitalizing on 
an endless deluge of medical breakthroughs. Despite this progress, many 
preventable diseases such as obesity, diabetes, heart disease, depression, and 
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anxiety continue to plague millions around the world, and appear to be increasing 
in frequency – in some cases dramatically so. Lieberman argues that the 
evolutionary story of our bodies is critical in describing the “dysevolutionary 
mismatch” between policy, societal conditions, and our evolved nature. His 
analysis suggests that our adapted response psychology interacts negatively 
with the chronic stress, caloric abundance, and sedentary lifestyle that typify 
modern life. He advocates incorporating an evolutionary perspective into the 
arena of public health, claiming that “society’s general failure to think about 
human evolution is a major reason we fail to prevent preventable diseases.” [30] 
These evolutionary mismatches place a heavy toll on public health infrastructure, 
and the United States spends more than two trillion dollars annually on 
healthcare costs, with more than 70 percent of these illnesses classified as 
preventable. [31]  
 What does it mean for a trait to be mismatched to the conditions we find 
ourselves in today? In an ancestral environment, humans struggled to maintain 
an energy surplus and this selected for a potent attraction to high-calorie, sugary 
foods. The overwhelming proportion and availability of high calorie, low-fiber 
foods in our modern diet interacts with this evolved tendency to consume these 
energy-rich foods at a high rate. This drives up obesity rates and increases 
susceptibility to type 2 diabetes. Additionally, our stress response evolved to 
induce a temporary state of heightened sensitivity toward a potentially harmful 																																																								
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external stimulus. The chronic stress experienced by many people today is 
profoundly different from that of our evolutionary predecessors, resulting more 
from social pressures than from immediate instances of flight or fight. Stress 
induces the release of cortisol, a hormone that stimulates an urge to bring energy 
into the body through caloric consumption. The interplay between our evolved 
appetites, food abundance, and stress reactions give rise to a situation where our 
evolved tendencies are mismatched to the context in which we live.  
Lieberman espouses a belief that culture is critical in influencing the manner 
in which we interact with the environment. In Catching Fire: How Cooking Made 
us Human, another work focused on our evolved relationship with food, Richard 
Wrangham provides a vivid account of how cooking is an instrumental 
component in the history of human evolution. [32] He cites numerous studies that 
have found that the body absorbs substantially more calories and nutrients from 
cooked food than raw food, creating an energy incentive to commit time to 
preparing food. Cooking is a method of increasing caloric efficiency by 
“outsourcing” a portion of the digestion process. He postulates that cooking was 
instrumental in providing the context in which the human brain, a massive energy 
consumer, was able to develop. He notes differences between the guts of apes 
and those of humans, concluding that cooking allowed humankind to divert 
investment in a bigger gut towards cerebral tissue and a brain with high-energy 
demands.  
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This case illustrates the notion of gene-cultural coevolution, a view in 
which genetic and cultural factors exist in a symbiotic and interrelated 
relationship. Lieberman points to cultural evolution as a potent force in shaping 
the mismatched environmental context of modern life. “The rate and power of 
cultural evolution has vastly outpaced the rate and power of natural selection, 
and the bodies we inherited are still adapted to a significant extent to the various 
and diverse environmental conditions in which we evolved over millions of years.” 
[33]   
 So how do we go about turning the tables on these negative 
consequences? “Education and empowering” may be generally ineffective in 
making a lasting difference, as human beings are not predisposed to making 
long-term calculations concerning calorie consumption or mental health. There 
was just no need to develop this sort of instinct when our ancestral environment 
was replete with instantaneous threats to caloric intake. The primary mechanism 
for change lies in our ability to manipulate the cultural context that drives our 
interaction with the environment. This can be done by rethinking social and 
economic policy. 
Cultural changes affect norms that influence action or inaction, and policy 
decisions are potent social factors that shape the interactions between culture 
and biology. Lieberman argues that “… interactions between the bodies we 
inherited, the environments we create, and the decisions we sometimes make 
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have set in motion an insidious feedback loop.” [34] This feedback loop occurs 
when policy decisions exacerbate the conditions of dysevolutionary mismatch. 
Lieberman advocates a sort of “libertarian paternalism,” in which government 
intervention encourages decisions that align with positive health outcomes while 
preserving the freedom of choice to defy the intent of these policies. He suggests 
that, “an evolutionary perspective suggests that we sometimes need help from 
external forces in order to help ourselves.” [35] These initiatives could include 
increased excise taxes, stricter standards on food labeling, regulation of 
marketing tactics used to pass sugar-packed foods as “fat-free,” and ending 
politically-entrenched farming subsidies that encourage the production of high-
fructose corn syrup.   
 If we are able to build policy prescriptions from an evolutionary description 
of our physiology, is it possible to use this approach in seeking answers to the 
psychological underpinnings that guide political behavior? There appears to be a 
substantially greater willingness to accept an evolutionary description of our 
bodies as opposed to the function of one specific body system - our brain 
(minds). Considering the relationship between physical health and our 
evolutionary history seems more approachable than efforts to relate adaptive 
processes to the intimidating complexity of human psychology. Politics is often 
thought to exist outside of organic reality, in a realm of ideas, values, and cultural 
norms. What is so powerful about evolutionary psychology and other evolutionary 																																																								
34 Lieberman, D. (2013) The story of the human body: Evolution, Health, and Disease. Random 
House. . p.xii 
35 Lieberman, D. (2013) The story of the human body: Evolution, Health, and Disease. Random 
House. . p.361 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	28			 	 	 	 	
	
approaches, is that these intangible energies associated with political thought are 
seen as consistent, even predicted, by an evolutionary perspective. Our mind is 
an evolved entity, a product of the gradual selection of neural mechanisms that 
has given rise to our remarkable capabilities for speech, thought, action, and 
politics. Political behavior does not exist outside of the constraints of our 
biological identity. Thus, an evolutionary epistemology allows us to formulate 
powerful conclusions concerning the nature of political action, the meaning of 
social constraints, and the power of environmental influence.  
 
Building Evolutionary Ideas  
 
 Before delving into a discussion of the political utility of evolution 
psychology, it is import to clarify the process by which evolutionary ideas are 
formed. A frequent criticism of evolutionary psychology claims that evolutionary 
scientists do not approach their work with scientific integrity, instead arriving at 
their conclusions through “just-so” stories. A “just-so” story is an attempt to 
supply an observed behavioral pattern with an organic origin by constructing an 
arbitrary evolutionary narrative explaining what is already known to be true. This 
criticism is commonly attributed to Jay Gould, an ardent critic of sociobiology in 
the 1970s, who viewed the emerging field as a “particular theory about human 
nature, which has no scientific support.” [36] Particular in this case is taken to 
mean arbitrary or idiosyncratic. “These pseduoscientists [sociobiologists] start 																																																								
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with an assumption…that they then support by selective data collection before 
constructing some sort of wild theory (namely a just-so story) about the 
evolutionary basis for what they assumed was true from the beginning.” [37]  
 Although still prevalent in contemporary assessments, Gould 
mischaracterizes the epistemological approach of the evolutionary behavioral 
sciences. The process of investigating an evolutionary basis for behavior begins, 
as any science would, on a set of testable presumptions. In the case of 
evolutionary approaches, researchers begin with a hypothesis that is grounded in 
evolutionary theory. They speculate on what sort of behavioral traits may have 
been selected for in ancestral conditions, and then go about testing the validity of 
their prediction by comparing their hypothesis with observed reality. In other 
words, an evolutionary narrative is not crafted to fit a particulate set of data. 
Rather, evolutionary theory is used to construct testable hypotheses based on 
what is expected to be true. This approach does not differ substantially from 
standard processes of good science found in other empirical disciplines.  
 In his text on evolutionary psychology, David Buss provides a four-tier 
framework for understanding the method of analysis behind evolutionary 
psychology. [38] The first level of thought is general evolutionary theory, which 
encompasses the broad application of natural selection and sexual selection as a 
mechanism for genetic change over time. Applying the theory of evolution to a 
specific adaptive problem leads to middle-level evolutionary theories. Middle-																																																								
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level assertions are broad in scope and can be empirically tested. One such 
theory argues that members of the sex that invests the most resources in their 
offspring will evolve to be more particular about mate selection than members of 
the opposite sex. Conversely, members of the sex that contributes the least 
resources are expected to have evolved to be less selective. Also, the members 
of the low-investing sex are anticipated to have higher levels of intrasexual 
competition as they struggle to gain access to a high-investing (and thus more 
selective) mates. The epistemological origin of this conclusion is grounded in 
evolutionary theory, not direct observations of conditions presumed to be true.  
 The interesting thing about this assertion is that it does not presuppose 
that the high-investing sex must be female, although lengthy gestation and the 
energy demands of lactation makes this more likely to be the case for humans. 
Male pipefish seahorses receive eggs from the female and incubate them as they 
carry them in a special pouch. These males commit extensive time and energy 
towards protecting their offspring during the incubation phase. In line with this 
evolutionary hypothesis, the female sea horses compete aggressively with each 
other for access to the most impressive males, while the males remain highly 
selective about what females to mate with. 
 If verified by observational data, a middle-level analysis can provide a path 
towards specific evolutionary hypotheses. In relation to parental investment, one 
could hypothesize that women have evolved mate preferences for men who are 
both able and willing to contribute resources to them and their children. This 
assertion begins to delve into the world of evolutionary psychology as it 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	31			 	 	 	 	
	
presupposes the existence of a “specific psychological mechanism – a desire – 
that is designed to solve a specific human adaptive problem, namely securing a 
mate who appears capable of investing in children.” [39] If we take as an 
important EEA for many human characteristics the range of settings associated 
with hunter-gather societies, it would be expected that the parameters of mate 
choice have aligned with traits that would be advantageous in this environment. 
For example, women may prefer men who have “athletic prowess, good hand-
eye coordination, and the physical endurance needed for hunting” because these 
traits demonstrate a capacity for resource commitment and protection. [40]  
 Specific hypotheses are then tested through empirical observations, and 
the verification of a specific evolutionary hypothesis leads to the formation of 
predictive assessments. One groundbreaking study compared the relative value 
males and females place on certain traits - earning capacity, ambition, 
industriousness, youth, physical attractiveness, and chastity - when searching for 
a partner across 37 cultures. [41] The results showed that women placed a higher 
value on cues for resources acquisition than did men, while men were more 
focused than were women on reproductive capacity in a potential partner. From 
this study, one could predict that women are more likely to prefer men that signal 
their willingness to invest in children or those associated with a higher social 
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status. [42] However, even the most fascinating prediction means nothing if it 
cannot endure repeated empirical investigation. Also, basing a prediction on a 
verified hypothesis does not automatically concede the validity of the 
assessment. The power of evolutionary theory relies on the weight of empirical 
support, not in the novelty or controversy of its predictions.  
 
Evolutionary Psychology  
 
 All behavior requires physical structures, and the mind cannot escape the 
constraints of its material form. Psychology, as an effort to study human behavior 
and the processes of the mind, can be characterized as an empirical 
investigation of “human nature” through the examination of individual cases and 
the establishment of general principles. Evolutionary psychology goes one step 
further in asserting that every species has an evolved nature, or distinguishing 
behavioral characteristics that define them as a species. Evolutionary psychology 
allows us to connect the past with the present by mapping the machinery of 
evolution and gaining insight on the products of that process.  
 Evolved psychological mechanisms form the conceptual core of 
evolutionary psychology. These are evolved behaviors resulting from selection 
forces that shape the interactions between environmental stimuli and cognitive 
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processes. Again, I refer to Buss’s textbook for conceptual clarification by looking 
at his six-stage definition for an evolved psychological mechanism: 
 
(1) An evolved psychological mechanism exists in the form that it does because it 
solved a specific problem of survival or reproduction recurrently over evolutionary 
history.  
(2) An evolved psychological mechanism is designed to take in only a narrow 
slice of information.  
(3) The input of an evolved psychological mechanism tells an organism the 
particular adaptive problem it is facing.  
(4) The input of an evolved psychological mechanism is transformed through 
decisions rules into output.  
(5) The output of an evolved psychological mechanism can be psychologically 
active, information to other psychological mechanisms, or manifest behavior.  
(6) The output of an evolved psychological mechanism is directed towards a 
solution to a specific adaptive problem. [43] 
 
 In sum, psychological mechanisms evolved because they produced 
relatively advantageous behavior in response to specific classes of adaptive 
challenges presented by EEAs. These environmental forces selected for 
psychological mechanisms that generate action according to sets of decision 
rules, and these actions provided the organism a fitness advantage. Take for 																																																								
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example seeing a snake slither across the ground next to you. As your eyes pick 
up on the apparent threat, your body is hit with an instantaneous jolt of panic, 
heightening your senses and forcing a reactionary decision. This moment 
requires the rapid synthesis of a visual cue, neurological response and 
mechanical action. The evolved (and largely implicit) initial fear response 
generated by the amygdala produces outputs to other brain systems, and leads 
to a set of decisions, freezing up or fleeing, that helps to navigate what could be 
a dangerous situation. Those organisms that were able to quickly recognize and 
react to the sight of a snake were at a relative advantage as compared to those 
with a slower physiological response or worse vision.  
 Anthropologist Lynne Isbell argues that primates have evolved a latent 
fear of serpents, pointing to a profound sensitivity to snake images across 
primate species. [44] She also suggests that the acuity and color sensitivity of our 
visual system owes much to the selection pressures provided by poisonous 
snakes. Her work points to discrepancies in vision abilities between primate 
species that live in areas with poisonous snake populations as opposed to those 
that do not. She argues that snakes established an adaptive impetus that led to 
the development of color vision and optical clarity in many primate species. Her 
theory helps to explain why lemurs in Madagascar have the worst color vision of 
any primate. With no brightly-colored poisonous snakes in their ecosystem, they 
simply lacked the selection pressures that could have led to better structures for 
this aspect of sight.  																																																								
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 But what about snake handlers? Why don’t they freeze up or run away at 
the sight of every snake; are they somehow destined to become snake handlers 
due to a glitch in their psychological system? Of course not, response 
mechanisms affect action by fast-tracking cognitive processes, but the 
astounding “specificity, complexity, and numerousness of the evolved 
psychological mechanisms” of the human mind give way to a remarkable level of 
behavioral flexibility. [45] The long evolutionary history of the brain allows for 
interplay between a tremendous number of different psychological processes. 
This multiplex of cognitive and affective systems defies behavioral rigidity 
through complex arrangements of psychological responses. Snake handlers are 
not missing a certain psychological mechanism, they simply rely on the inherent 
complexity of neural responses to modify and control their fear response.  
 Some critics object to the very existence of psychological mechanisms, or 
scoff at any biological basis for common behavioral traits. Opponents may claim 
that behavior is entirely a product of learning and cultural inputs as opposed to 
rigid characteristics infused through evolution. In truth, this critique is aimed an 
evolutionary straw-man. All evolutionary scientists acknowledge the profound 
impact of learning and cultural variance in shaping human behavior. In fact, the 
conceptual foundations of evolutionary sciences stress the importance of cultural 
learning and social input.  Social constructs and cultural norms enter our minds 
through an interaction with environmental stimuli, just as all evolved behavior is 
the result of interactions with exogenous inputs.  																																																								
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 Evolutionary psychology does not value nature over nurture, or vice versa. 
From a singular molecular process to genetic progression across evolutionary 
time, the process of evolution is driven by interactions between an organism and 
their environment. Because selection pressures are context specific, behaviors 
are also highly dependent on situational circumstance. Psychological 
mechanisms often require outside stimulus in order to function, and our identity 
as cooperative, social beings means that humans have developed extensive 
mechanisms to respond to cultural and social inputs. [46] Our ability to absorb 
information from the environment, transform it, and be changed by it is the 
process of learning. This astounding feature of the evolved mind requires the 
existence of cognitive mechanisms that allow for the perception, analysis, and 
storage of contextual interactions. The obvious fluidity of the human mind does 
not negative evolutionary claims. Quite the opposite is true; evolutionary theory 
sheds light the mind’s evolutionary advantage in having outstanding cognitive 
flexibility and a remarkable capacity to absorb new information from our material 
and social environment. 
 
Relevant Criticisms   
 
 Although the degree of refutation varies greatly across different disciplines 
and subfields of economics, political science, and anthropology, the most 
persistent opposition towards any notion of human nature comes from those who 																																																								
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subscribe to social constructivism. At the turn of the 19th century, constructivist 
scholars set the stage for the modern rejection of human nature. [47] Subscribers 
to his view, and various offshoots that proliferated during the 20th century, insist 
that behavior is shaped solely by social inputs and that any notion of human 
predispositions to violence, greed, or even generosity is out of line with reality. 
Many argue that a search for human nature is conceptually perilous, and morally 
suspect, insisting that any vision of a latent human identity is ripe with bias, 
prejudice, and mistaken assumptions. The modern social sciences often cast 
aside evolutionary approaches by demonizing an epistemology they see as 
reductionist and ignorant of proximate social influence.  
 Margret Mead looked to entrench cultural transmission as the sole 
determinant of human behavior through a cross-cultural analysis of sexuality. 
Through her 1928 anthropological study of the Samoan people, she reported to 
have found a tropical paradise free from the constraints of gender roles and 
without competition, violence, or sexual abuse. In many ways, her account of 
Samoan society fit the ideals of Rousseau’s fantasy of the “noble savage,” 
leading many to blame the moral shortcomings of Western culture as the central 
source of these evils. [48] 
 Although initially seen as a deadly blow to any ubiquitous account of 
human social behavior, Mead’s investigation seems to have broken down after 
an in-depth analysis of her data and methodology. A study by Derek Freeman 																																																								
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discovered that the Samoan islanders Mead had previous thought to be peaceful 
were actually intensely competitive, and they had higher rates of murder and 
rape than the United States. [49] Donald Brown’s Human Universals further 
supported Freeman’s rebuttal, asserting that there is more to human nature than 
a simple “capacity for culture.” [50] Many linger on the dreams of a society free of 
violence, competition, or sex differences, and despite the demonstrated 
inadequacies of her data, references to Mead are frequent in texts critical of an 
evolutionary approach to human behavior.  
 Advocates of this “blank slate” conception of the mind argue that we can 
bring humanity into line with normative ideals exclusively through cultural means. 
“Centuries – no, millennia – of effort in this line have largely failed, but that does 
not seem to daunt the keepers of this buoyant faith.” [51] Innumerous religious 
institutions and political powers have tried to bring human nature in line with their 
moral creeds. Yet even religious institutions, that deny the existence of 
noninterventionist evolution, acknowledge the struggle and sacrifice required to 
bring oneself in line with an idealistic code. If there is not such thing as human 
nature, then what intangible force are these idealists constantly fighting against? 
 Beyond the blank slate debate, there are also varying lines of criticism 
regarding the epistemological prejudice and historical misuse of the evolutionary 
perspective. A pressing critique, and one that is especially important in light of 
this thesis, is that evolutionary theory provides justification for immoral and 																																																								
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bankrupt political systems. Previous attempts to use evolutionary thinking in 
understanding social conditions have sought to combine biological determinism 
with political power. Herbert Spencer was a renowned intellectual at the end of 
the 19th century, and applied “survival of the fitness” to his social critiques. [52] He 
urged a resistance to humanitarianism in an effort to hasten the process of 
natural selection in weeding out the weak from the societal gene pool. This 
perverse ideology bled into political programs in the early 20th century under the 
auspices of social “Darwinism” and the Eugenics movements. An unholy alliance 
between biological determinism and large scale “progressive” efforts to improve 
humanity led to the sterilization of thousands based on their perceived 
“ignorance,” and provided a pseudo-intellectual backing for racial superiority. [53] 
Eugenics was a dominating force in American ideology at the turn of the century, 
and inspired German biologist Ernst Haeckel to state that “politics is applied 
biology.” Haeckel’s (and other’s) defense of racism, nationalism, and genetic 
determinism was later used as a rational defense for the Nazi’s “final solution.” 
[54] 
These criticisms are powerful objections that demand a credible defense. 
Genetic determinism, a pseudoscientific charge that long plagued the 
evolutionary sciences, has been discredited. A more complex understanding of 
basic evolutionary theory leads us to conclude what should have been obvious 
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from the very beginning. Genes do not determine the worth of a person, nor do 
they completely account for the various characteristics and dispositions of 
different people. Genetic determinism ignored a foundational tenet of modern 
evolutionary thought; that the answer to the age-old question of nature vs. 
nurture is not one or the other, but an utter and resounding “both.” 
 More complete philosophical understandings have changed the way 
evolution interacts with larger normative questions. In 1903, philosopher G.E. 
Moore used the is-ought problem articulated by David Hume to assert that it is 
fallacious to claim “goodness” on the basis of what may be “beneficial” in nature. 
[55] This objection to biological determinism is referred to as the naturalistic 
fallacy and has since become a guiding principle for the application of 
evolutionary thought. In this view, evolved traits are not morally justified by their 
adapted existence. The evolutionary sciences aim to describe the conditions and 
constraints of our adapted identity; they do not strive to affirm normative 
judgments by describing the facts of the natural world (in which humans are very 
much embedded). As stated by Steven Pinker, “the goal of science is 
exploration, not justification.” [56] 
A related and much-cited criticism of sociobiology is that separating the 
sexes based on evolved traits is inherently sexist. “Darwinians have spent the 
past 40 years trying to explain and justify [gender differences in sexual behavior] 
on evolutionary grounds.” [57] Evolution has been accused of stabilizing a 
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patriarchal status quo by providing a genetic basis for what we conceive of as 
masculine and feminine traits. How could evolution possibly account for the 
fluidity of gender identity and sexual orientation? As stated time and time again, 
evolutionary psychologists realize that environmental context is a significant 
influence in the phenotypic expression of behavior.  
Social influence on how gender differences are expressed in society does 
not run counter to an evolutionary approach. Cultural variations in perceptions of 
gender are indeed worthy of scholarly analysis and critique. However, the 
susceptibility of gender expression to social influence does not nullify the impact 
of our genes in shaping cognitive pathways linked to biological sex. Just as 
genes impact physical appearances, basic differences in the genetic 
configurations of males and females influence the function of neural networks 
and psychological mechanisms. This section of the thesis outlined the principles 
of the evolutionary approach and wrestled with some its most significant 
criticisms. The following discussion will focus on implementing the evolutionary 
perspective in our thinking about political action, policy formation, and social 
identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	42			 	 	 	 	
	
Section 2: Evolution and the Social Sciences 
 
 “It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be 
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, 
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature.” 
 - James Madison, Federalist No. 51  
"Science is the most durable and non-divisive way of thinking about the 
human circumstance. It transcends cultural, national, and political boundaries. 
You don't have American science versus Canadian science versus Japanese 
science." 
     - Sam Harris, Neurophilosopher [58] 
 
A Political Animal in the Modern World 
 
The previous discussion outlined the foundational components of 
evolutionary psychology and addressed some prominent criticisms. The following 
section will look to explore how we can better understand political behavior by 
acknowledging the influence of our evolved psychological mechanisms. What, if 
anything, can an evolutionary perspective tell us about the origins of political 
action? What would it look like to apply evolutionary thinking to a set of policy 
problems? Would we be able to formulate better of policy as a result of these 
findings? How far does the reach of evolutionary theory go in supplementing our 
normative vision of the social world?  
An evolutionary approach to modern politics involves an investigation of 
the adaptive challenges associated with social conflict and the formation of 																																																								
58 Yang, Peter. "Print: Atheism’s Poster Boy Sam Harris on the Science of Morality." Wired.com. 
Conde Nast Digital, n.d. Web. 18 Apr. 2016 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	43			 	 	 	 	
	
empirically verifiable predictions for corresponding adaptions. It also requires a 
nuanced understanding of how these adaptive solutions fit into the modern 
realities of mass politics. The following section will explore the intersection of 
evolution and political science in an effort to demonstrate the utility of 
incorporating evolutionary theory into the social science discourse. The 
discussion that follows is a preliminary investigation into the value of 
understanding our evolved nature in the context of political and social behavior. 
First, I will outline general guidelines for thinking about politics from an 
evolutionary perspective. Second, I will use evidence to show that human beings 
are evolutionarily primed to form coalitions and engage in the political 
prioritization of interests. Finally, I will draw on this evidence to argue for a 
revised behavioral model distinct from those prevalent in mainstream social 
science.  
 
A social advantage  
 
 Social life emerges “when organisms designed for propagation of their 
own genes come to depend on each other.” [59] This stripped down definition of 
organismal interaction provides the conceptual basis for applying evolutionary 
theory to questions of social exchange. Mid-range evolutionary theories are 
applicable to the study of politics, as political decision making falls under the 
same sort of cognitive constraints as all other psychological processes. Although 																																																								
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selection pressures work through fitness inequalities, it is important to clarify that 
human beings do not strive to maximize fitness outcomes through a conscious 
assessment of how social rules will affect their reproductive prospects. We have 
evolved psychological mechanisms, which are not explicitly conscious 
processes, which utilize environmental inputs and produce behavior that would 
have enhanced fitness in ancestral circumstances. [60] The collective fitness 
advantage of certain behaviors selected for cognitive mechanisms that aligned 
for these sorts of advantageous social behaviors.   
 In 1971 Robert Trivers, while still a graduate student at Harvard, put forth 
an argument for reciprocal altruism among nonrelated organisms. As defined by 
Trivers, reciprocal altruism is behavior that temporarily reduces one’s fitness and 
increases the fitness of another, with the expectation that the other organism will 
act in a similar way in the future. Trivers calculated the costs and benefits of such 
behavior and arrived at a clear representation of the benefits of mutually 
beneficial relationships between members of the same species. [61] Those 
organisms that worked together through reciprocal altruism gained a degree of 
fitness enhancement that selected for cooperative capacities in a multitude of 
species, including our own.  
The importance of social cohesion in solving environmental challenges 
helped select for traits that have formed humans into a political animal. Our 
capacity to work together is itself an advantage, but it is important to remember 
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that evolution works on an individual level. Thus, social cohesion has instilled in 
individuals psychological mechanisms that specialize in the assessment of social 
information and allows for the amalgamation of interests. Being able to recognize 
and relate to rules and norms is an adapted skill formed in the crucible of small-
scale group living.  
The ability of human beings to centralize information through collective 
learning and cultural transmission is critical to our success as a species. [62] 
Humans have a profound ability to collectivize interests in an effort to solve larger 
challenges, and subsequently pass down environmental information from 
generation to generation. Forming social groups is clearly advantageous, but 
what arise from this propensity are conflicts between members of a group over 
resource allocation. How do social groups structure power relationships? How do 
they deal with outsides and insiders? How do they go about distributing 
resources? These are questions that are just as relevant now as they were in an 
ancestral environment. Social cohesion may be one of our greatest assets as a 
species, but it also presents unique challenges in distributing the fruits of our 
labor. These problems arise so frequently that we have created a catch-all term 
for the unending challenge of prioritizing interests within the context of a social 
group: politics. Evolutionary political psychology aims to apply lessons from the 
evolutionary psychology to the special social interactions that humans term 
political behavior.  
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If politics is taken to be the prioritization of interests, then much of the 
political world revolves around expectations of entitlement. [63] Individuals feel 
entitled to certain resources (food, status, aid) and outcomes (reproductive 
success, general wellbeing). Politics can be thought of as the arrangement of 
individual interests within a group that aims to solve “coordination problems.” [64] 
Governing by rules presents its own adaptive advantages. Group cohesion 
based on norms of exchange reduces the costs of infighting and constant 
negation, providing a selection mechanism that led to a “sense of social 
regularity.” [65] Our ability to set rules of cooperation in a social system provided 
two benefits in an ancestral environment. (1) It allowed for individuals to tackle 
challenges that they could not have overcome on their own, and (2) it prevents 
(or at least limits) infighting between individuals in a group.  
The establishment of these rules has specific costs and benefits for 
particular individuals within the group. [66] Politics is inherently linked with 
unequal outcomes, and selection pressures have led to the development of 
powerful cognitive tools that allow us to navigate the political relationships of 
group living. Throughout most of our human history, it would have been 
advantageous to down-regulate the entitlement of others and develop strategies 
to counteract down-regulation of one’s own interest. Politics revolves around the 
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currency of social information, and broadcasting one’s interests or downplaying 
the interests of others has proven to be an evolutionarily advantageous strategy.  
The psychological mechanisms for social interaction have been forged in 
the primordial EEA of small-scale, hunter-gather societies. The emergence of 
mass political societies is a relatively new development (and from an evolutionary 
perspective, an extraordinarily recent development), occurring in most areas of 
the world only in the last 500 years. [67] This era of societal expansion is 
infinitesimally small compared to our evolutionary history. The primary 
Environments of Evolutionary Adaptedness for much of human social behavior 
would have been devoid of large-scale social structures, with most individuals 
living in small groups of 25-100 members. Because there are massive 
discrepancies (mismatches) between the politics of small-scale hunter-gather 
groups and the arena of mass politics in the modern world, the psychological 
mechanisms evolved to deal with political issues are not always well suited to 
large-scale society. Again we see how dysevolutionary mismatch might affect our 
interaction with the modern world. [68] The psychological mechanisms by which 
we experience mass politics are those that have evolved from small-scale social 
relations in the context of our ancestral environments.  
If humans have evolved a universal capacity for political behavior, then 
different societies across the cultural spectrum are expected to focus on solving 
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the same sorts of typical collaborative problems. [69] Across varying cultures, 
there appears to be a general consensus about what sorts of actions constitute 
criminal behavior. [70] This study of the ubiquities of social deviance concluded 
that similarities in severity of punishment align with the fitness consequences that 
these crimes would have had in ancestral conditions. Although different political 
entities may face similar problems, it is obvious that they do not reach the same 
conclusions or operate according to the same rules. This is because 
psychological mechanisms are context dependent, and human behavior 
manifests itself in different ways under varying social and environmental 
constraints. Evolutionary political psychology can be thought of as a “rubber 
cage,” as humans seek novel solutions to prioritization problems through 
“improvisational intelligence.”  [71]  
Evolutionary perspectives allow for a broad conception of politics, as these 
adaptive mechanisms affect how we participate in a wide range of social 
institutions. The way that we partake in and manipulate our position in the 
workplace, family life, and even fraternities and sororities stems from 
mechanisms evolved for social interaction in small-scale groups. “[Evolutionary] 
psychology motivates solutions that worked under these circumstances. In other 
words, when modern individuals reason about political issues such as criminal 
justice, social welfare, and immigration, they reason about them using 
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psychological mechanisms designed to handle related adaptive problems such 
as counterexploitation, cheater-detection, and newcomers in the context of small-
scale, ancestral group life.” [72] 
 
Coalitions and mass politics  
 
The impersonal nature of mass politics invites individuals to pass 
judgment on situations, individuals, and actions without substantial direct 
experience. This exacerbates the importance of social information as people 
base their opinions on information provided by others. In a small-scale society, 
people pass judgment relative to their personal relationships with a certain 
individual or group of individuals. In today’s mass society, our evolved 
mechanisms for social participation often operate through generalizations based 
on indirect information.  
The psychological mechanisms for processing social information are 
highly dependent on the context in which the information is presented, and 
people process the opinions of media outlets, pundits, political elites, friends, and 
family based on questions of mutual interest. Do I trust this source of 
information? Do they affiliate with the same group as me? Are they keeping in 
mind my own interests? These are basic questions of communication, but their 
origins can be traced to the evolutionary context of small-group decision making. 
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Evolutionary psychology does not stray from the norms of conventional political 
science or sociology in acknowledging the importance of context, or that social 
signaling matters. However, evolutionary psychology provides an additional level 
of analysis as to explain why these factors impact political behavior.   
 The tendency to seek political information from others is especially 
important in the context of coalitions. Coalitions are “individuals who in engage in 
repeated, delayed, and reciprocal exchanges of help and resources,” [73] and 
evolutionary theory would predict the evolution of mechanisms to direct 
resources to those perceived to be a part of one’s coalition network of exchange. 
Coalition building is a messy, complicated process of social cohesion and 
interest alignment. To solve this problem humans have developed sensitive 
social mechanisms to confront the adaptive challenges associated with building 
coalitions. Joining coalitions (of those that we are free to choose) requires a two 
part assessment: What is the relative strength of this coalition and how closely 
does it align with my own interests? Coalitions are evident at every level of 
political association. Political parties, interest groups, even states themselves can 
be said to be evidence of coalition building within mass politics. Membership in 
these cooperative networks has potent effects on the behavioral patterns of 
political actors.  
Coalitions not only affect the way that people perceive who will benefit 
from a system of rules or the exchange of resources, but they also affect 
judgment on rules based solely on association with a group. Coalitions require 																																																								
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the exchange of support, meaning that members are willing to support others in 
their interests because they expect that they will return the favor once their 
interests are at stake. Thus, a prominent phenomenon within coalitions is the 
reciprocated adoption of opinion in order to advance the interests of the coalition 
as a whole in the face of opposition.  
This seems to extend to mass politics in obvious ways. There is never a 
perfect correlation between party position and public opinion, meaning that there 
must be a series of tradeoffs in advancing the interests of the party as a whole. 
Coalitional associations are held together by powerful psychological mechanisms 
that often merge identification with identity. Association with political parties has 
been shown to follow the same cognitive patterns of identification as other 
powerful coalitional associations, such as race. [74] The single most important 
determinant of voting preference is party identification. Also, people have been 
shown to vote according to party identification regardless of policy content. [75] 
Modern politics draw on psychological mechanisms for coalition building that 
create powerful group identities based on political membership and signals of 
commitment.  
The evolutionary perspective asks profound questions about the nature of 
political parties. To what extent is public opinion a product of social commitments 
to a coalition as opposed to an analysis of policy position? How does this free up 
elite stakeholders and interest groups to control party agendas regardless of 																																																								
74 Pietraszewski, D., Curry, O.S. Peterson, M. B. Cosmides, L. and Tooby, R. (2015) Constituents 
of politics cognition: race, party politics, and the alliance detection system. Cognition, 140, 24-39. 
75 Miller, W. E. (1991) Party identification, realignment, and party voting: Back to the basics. The 
American Political Science Review, 557-568 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	52			 	 	 	 	
	
consistency benefits? Is ideology a powerful enough force to hold political groups 
together without the psychological pressures of demonstrating coalition 
membership? These are standard questions in political science but they are 
enlightened by the discussion of coalitional politics in ways that would not be 
possible without the introduction of evolutionary psychology.  
The Political Physiology Lab at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln has 
tried to elucidate the link between evolved psychology and political opinion by 
comparing the neurological reactions of liberals and conservatives. They did this 
by measuring physiological reactions such as galvanic skin response and eye 
gaze patterns in response to certain images. They recorded large discrepancies 
between the reaction patterns of liberals and conservatives. When shown 
pictures of positive images (bunnies, smiling children) and negative images 
(wounds, a person eating worms), conservatives showed a much greater and 
more focused reaction to the negative stimulus than liberals. They concluded that 
conservatives have a greater “negative bias,” meaning they are more likely to 
focus on negative stimulus. In their opinion, liberals and conservatives simply 
“experience and process different worlds.” Their studies suggest that 
conservatives tend to perceive the world as more threatening, and are less 
tolerant of “disgusting” images. “Bedrock political orientations just naturally mesh 
with a broader set of orientations, tastes, and preferences because they are all 
part of the same biologically rooted inner self,” write Hibbing et al. [76] 
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Quantitative studies have also demonstrated interesting parallels between 
political preference and physiological traits. One example comes from the 
relationship between bellicosity and self-interest in relation to male’s physical 
strength. Stronger males have been shown to be more likely to a support war as 
a means of solving international problems [77] and they are also more likely to 
support policies that benefit their own group as opposed to others. [78] There are 
also studies that suggest that physical strength is associated with a propensity to 
favor policies that align with economic interests. The inverse of this has also 
been shown to be true, in that those who favor these sorts of self-interested 
policies show a greater desire to gain strength. [79] In evolutionary terms, males 
with a heightened sense of physical power display increased resource 
expectations and see themselves as more inclined to win a physical conflict.  
One study demonstrating the link between biological needs and political 
psychology involves the relationship between hunger and feelings towards 
redistributive policy. [80] This experiment concluded that when hungry, individuals 
are more likely to favor redistributive policies than when not. Under selection 
pressures, those in conditions of resources scarcity have a fitness incentive to 
seek out downwardly distributive social rules. Although this may seem intuitive, 																																																								
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the correlation of such a basic biological phenomena with political preference 
makes one wonder about the other potential associations between physiological 
states and political behavior. These sorts of investigations are outside the 
bounds of conventional political science, and require a deeper understanding of 
the evolutionary perspective.  
 One reason why this field of biopolitics may be so overlooked is because 
conventional social science emphasizes environmental context as the most 
pressing factor in building political opinion. This may very well be true, but 
environmental importance does not negative the impact of evolved effects. 
Political judgments arise through a complex mix of environmental stimulus and 
life experiences, but these sorts of decisions have also been shown to be 
correlated with evolved physical systems in our physiology. Alford and Hibbing 
argue that shared environment may be not as potent a factor as once thought in 
determining political preferences. [81] One aspect of their study compared the 
political differences between identical and fraternal twins. The identical twins, 
being the most genetically similar, were shown to have a much higher degree of 
overlap in political opinion when controlling for environmental pressures. Their 
study concluded that up to 40% of the variability in political ideology is linked to 
genetics, and that “we are in a situation where most of our theories of personality 
development need rewriting.” [82] 
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 Political scientists Green, Palmquist and Schickler argue that citizens ask 
themselves two questions when deciding party affiliation. “What kinds of social 
groups come to mind as I think about Democrats, Republicans, and 
Independents?  [And] which assemblage of groups (if any) best describes me?” 
This leads us to believe that the basis of political behavior is fundamentally 
social. [83] In a small-scale group scenario, perceptions of social ramifications 
would have been fundamental in the prioritization of interests. It makes 
evolutionary sense for modern politics to be profoundly personal, as people look 
to invest themselves in political coalitions seeking the same sorts of advantages 
that led to the evolution of social cohesion.  
“The mental representations underlying mass political judgments are (a) 
less contained by shared direct experiences and (b) rely heavily on internally 
generated representations” [84] This inflates the possibility of conflict, as political 
skirmishes more commonly occur due to abstraction and stereotyping, rather 
than concrete cases. [85] Coalitional conflict can erupt in violence, and evidence 
suggests that humans have a tendency to engage in violent coalitional action. [86] 
However, coalitional status is just as much an information game, as hierarchies 
are often built off of the perception of group strength. The importance of 
perception has selected for sensitive psychological processes to assess status 																																																								
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and coalitional strength. “For the evolutionary political psychologist, the symbols, 
parades, and debates that surround politics are not merely “theatre” or “cheap 
talk,” as a rational choice theorist would argue. These are the very strategies 
through which political interests are pursued, they are designed to tap into 
human psychology and mobilize support or counter the mobilization of support.” 
[87]   
One theater of war in modern politics is the campaign trail. Negative 
campaigns are efforts to destroy the integrity or effectiveness of oppositional 
leadership, thereby causing supporters to question their coalitional loyalty. What 
is especially interesting is that some research suggests that humans have 
outsmarted their own coalitional attack strategies by developing the ability to 
distinguish between self-interested informational attacks and worthy criticism. 
Negative campaigns have a tendency to backfire because they are recognized 
as a self-interested attack seeking to downgrade the status of a competing 
individual. These attack often fail as supporters rally to the side of their coalition 
in a display of solidarity. [88]  
 
Status, reputation, and conditional cooperation   
 
 Over the course of human history, higher status has been associated with 
more cooperative partners, more friends, more reproductive partners, and more 																																																								
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resources. Social status can be thought of as the currency of the bio-social world, 
and actors competing for status interact in a zero-sum game. If one organism has 
more, the other has less. The primary mechanism by which humans compete for 
status is through forming coalitions. This tendency to find strength through 
numbers is a driving selection mechanism for the development of social groups 
and humans have developed complex psychological mechanisms in order to 
navigate conditions of social cohesion and status maintenance. [89] 
 A classical interpretation of the prisoner’s dilemma prescribes taking the 
selfish position every time, as the benefits of defection on aggregate outweigh 
the positives of cooperation. In the context of our ancestral environment, 
defecting from social cooperation in the name of self-interest also came with 
significant advantages. Stealing resources or defecting on cooperative 
agreements provided an opportunity to capitalize on the gullibility of others to 
enter into vulnerable social arrangements. If there was such a great advantage to 
be selfish in small-scale social arrangements, then why has cooperation evolved 
at all? The key to the evolution of cooperative behavior is freedom of choice. 
Members of a small-scale society had the opportunity to choose whom they 
would cooperate with, and those successful partnerships would have enjoyed a 
significant advantage over those that went about life on their own.  
 The ability of our ancestors to choose cooperative partners required the 
development of complex psychological mechanisms for calculating who could be 
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trusted. [90] []91 One way to make this sort of judgment was to pick on the social 
cues of who is a good cooperator and who is not. Cooperating with others sends 
a signal to those around you that you are a good cooperator and thus someone 
worthy of sharing resources with. [92] There were no political institutions to punish 
defection from cooperative arrangements in the EEA, but the competitive 
advantage that results from working together provides an incentive to maintain a 
reputation for cooperation.   
 Reputation is invariably linked with status and cooperative benefits, and 
this selected for particularly powerful motivations to preserve one’s reputation. 
One example comes from an experiment conducted by Nolan, Schulta, and 
Cialdini. Flyers were posted to houses urging people to use fans instead of air 
conditioners, but different reasons were given to motivate people to make the 
change. One group was told that the switch would save them $54 per month on 
electricity. Another flyer stated that they would prevent the release of 100 kilos of 
greenhouse gas. Yet another group was told that 77% of their neighbors were 
making the change. In evaluating the electricity meters of those involved in the 
study, the first two statements resulted in no change, while framing the action as 
“community choice” resulted in a 10% decrease in electricity consumption [93]  																																																								
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 Another example of this phenomena comes from the Behavioural Insight 
team, a group charged with analyzing the effectiveness of different messages in 
persuading people to pay taxes on time. They sent letters to over 140,000 people 
in the United Kingdom urging them to pay their taxes. One group of recipients 
received standard reminders of their filing deadline. Others received messages 
that stated that 9 out of 10 Brits paid their taxes on time. A subset of these 
messages made reference to high percentages of regional and local rates of 
payment. The results pointed to a 15% increase in tax payment from the letters 
focused on social motivation over the standard control group. It is estimated that 
this sort of cooperation centered strategy led to the on-time payment of over 
$160,000 million during the course of the study. [94]   
 In another study, individuals staying in a hotel were asked to reuse towels 
in an effort to control energy costs. One group of guests received a note asking 
to save their towel out of environmental concern. Another group received a note 
with the same environmental message and a note that stated that 75% of others 
guests had joined them in saving towels. The amount of people who reused 
towels was 25% higher in the group primed with the evidence of a social norm. 
 What this suggests, is that human beings are primarily conditional 
cooperators, in that we base our interactions with others on how they act in 
return. [95] Thus, in forming policy we must understand how individuals perceive 
the actions of others. Humans are apt to act on the basis of reputation, and social 
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norms often affect behavior. In terms of policy formation, if people perceive 
others as cooperative, they are more likely to follow suit. This seems like an 
intuitive function, but placing it within the context of our evolutionary psychology 
allows us to see the true power of this type of calculation. This leads us to 
believe that people are not arbitrarily inconsistent in their choice to cooperate, 
rather they choose whether or not to cooperation based on their perception of 
social conditions.  
 
Understanding Irrationality 
 
The utter complexity of human behavior owes much to the paradoxical 
nature of our decisions. People act in ways contrary to their rational self-interest. 
Some spend excessively on superfluous things only to find themselves penniless 
after retirement. Others overeat and refrain from exercise only to find themselves 
overweight or diabetic. The same people who have an obvious capacity for 
brilliance can make unbelievably dumb decisions, and those that seem incredibly 
generous can at times be cruelly selfish. Despite these apparent faults, it would 
be a crude generalization to claim that people are weak of will or ignorant of their 
best interests. People can display immense drive and calculated strategy by 
pursuing goals in their careers, athletics, and everyday life. How can we account 
for these inconsistencies? What factors does a conventional social science 
approach point to in explaining the irrationality and apparent weaknesses of 
human behavior? Does evolutionary psychology provide a better pathway for 
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explaining the paradoxical tendencies of humans to be brilliant yet stupid, lazy 
yet resolute? 
The social sciences strive to tap into the patterns that govern these types 
of behavioral decisions. Understanding the conditions in which intelligence 
trumps ignorance or generosity overcomes selfishness would allow us to 
understand what types of social policies are likely to produce socially beneficial 
behavior. A classical economics approach assumes humans to be rational, self-
interested actors that go about their lives making decisions based on a 
calculative assessment of economic, social, and political options. This model 
blames policy shortcomings on market failures or institutional inadequacies. 
However, this standard conception of homo economics is oversimplified and falls 
short of explaining the apparent paradoxes of human behavior. A blind 
adherence to the power of market forces to shape rational action leads to naïve 
policy conclusions that neglect the complex motivations behind human decision 
making. 
 Behavioral economics deviates from the classical approach by recognizing 
the inconsistent logic prevalent in human behavior. This approach points to 
irrationality or weakness of will in determining why people fail to make the best 
decisions. This appears to be a step closer to the realities of human behavior, but 
behavioral economics does explain why human beings act in the ways they do. 
Evolutionary theory aligns with behavioral economics in concluding that human 
beings are far from perfectly rational, but it does not assume that humanity is 
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generally dumb or weak of will. It is not enough to claim that humans are simply 
rational or irrational, generous or selfish, intelligent or stupid. It may seem 
irrational to not save money for retirement, or a weakness of will to overeat high-
calorie foods, but simply blaming these irrational behaviors on human weakness 
does nothing to provide a path to a solution. An evolutionary approach supplies 
an answer to both how and why human behavior deviates from a rational 
approach. This more sophisticated level of analysis allows us to use middle-level 
evolutionary theories in predicting the successes and failures of human action by 
scrutinizing the interaction between the evolve tendencies and the socio-political 
environment. 
The evolutionary perspective provides us with the tools to understand the 
shortcomings of human rationality through understanding conditional restraints 
and cognitive propensities. “[Humans] are predictably intelligent and predictably 
stupid, predictably altruistic and predictably selfish. Their achievements and 
failures follow certain patters, which are specific to humans. Uncovering the logic 
behind these patterns can enable us to design better policies, policies that 
account for the built-in constraints of human nature (shortsightedness, greed, 
cognitive biases), while using its core features (generosity, endurance, natural 
social experience) as levers to achieve goals that cannot be achieved using 
standard approaches” [96] In the evolutionary approach, the logic of human 
behavior lies in the cognitive mechanisms which produce it. [97] Expanding on our 																																																								
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knowledge of evolutionary constraints can allow us to build policy with these 
tendencies in mind. 
 Human beings can be incredibly efficient when a task is in line with 
adapted mechanisms and total dunces when asked to go outside our evolved 
proclivities. We effortlessly store an enormous memory bank of facial 
appearances, while we often have trouble remembering a four-digit pin number. 
Increasing the distance between a social goal and the adaptive mechanisms that 
have shaped human cognition only increases the difficulty of the task at hand. It 
is not as though we are incapable of tasks that may be at odds with evolutionary 
mechanisms, we are just not suited to perform them with relative ease. For the 
vast majority of human existence, there would have been no reason to focus on 
long-term financial security, or refrain from overeating in order to prevent a 
chronic health condition. Evolutionary pressures to develop mechanisms to cope 
with the long-term challenges of modern life were simply in short supply in an 
ancestral environment.  
 Evolution not only tells us something about the goals that people tend to 
seek out. Evolutionary theory would suggest that ambitions align with objectives 
that would have led to beneficial outcomes in an ancestral environment. These 
sorts of goals would include raising a child, demonstrating one’s worth to the 
community, or increasing status. These sorts of tendencies have powerful effects 
on the way that people operate within a modern economic and political system.  
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 An interesting proposition that stems from this assessment claims that 
money may not necessarily as powerful a motivation as the rational choice model 
assumes, because the abstract conception of saving for retirement or paying the 
electricity bill is far removed from the problems that the adapted mind has been 
designed to solve. Abstract systems linked to status (i.e. money) simply did not 
exist in the context of small-scale hunter gatherer groups. The most effective way 
to save for the future would not have been an economic calculation, but 
investment in a strong coalition of friends and family that would help in times of 
need. [98] Humans have developed mechanisms to store resources “in the body 
and minds of other people, in the form of memory of my generosity they feel 
obliged to repay when fortunes are reversed” [99] Changes in social climates may 
increase or decrease the motivation to seek money as a source of status.   
 Applying this lens to the administrative tasks required by complex systems 
of norms and laws shows that these convoluted and detailed tasks are often out 
of touch with evolutionary motivations. It may not be the case that people are 
simply too lazy or too dumb to figure out an administrative process; these tasks 
merely diverge from those motivated by our evolved mental mechanisms. In a 
study regarding the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), the 
percentage of completed applications substantially increased when the 
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paperwork was prepopulated. [100] Conventional wisdom would suggest that 
students have a clear incentive to fill out this paperwork despite any sort of 
assistance. But administrative processes are so is detached from any sort of 
evolutionary mechanisms for action that they are often left uncompleted. 
Evolutionary theory could allow policy bureaucratic systems to foresee barriers to 
these administrative tasks required by government structures.  
 Moving beyond a blank slate conception of social and political actors 
shows us how naïve it may be to sit around and wait for people to become better 
citizens. Simply complaining about a lack of participation will do nothing to bring 
administrative task in line with the forces that motivate action. Yes, people are 
obliged to take responsibility for themselves and their wellbeing, but realizing the 
extent to which certain processes of modern socio-political systems fall out of line 
with psychological triggers allows us to craft simple changes aimed at improving 
citizenship and social participation. “Traditional public policies assume that 
people are rational and that the only reason they make bad decisions is that they 
are ill-informed or not incentivized enough” [101] Evolutionary psychology allows 
for a more complete calculation of the motivational forces that influence human 
behavior within social and political arrangements.  
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Section 3: Shining a Light on Inequality 
  
Inequality and Evolutionary Psychology 
 
 Armed with a new perspective on humanity’s socio-political identity, we 
now move to applying an evolutionary perspective to pressing policy issue: 
inequality. Can we use evolutionary psychology to predict the behavioral patterns 
of those facing inequality? What can evolutionary theory tell us about our 
response to inequality as dictated by altruism, social cohesion, concern for status 
and resources, intrasexual and intersexual competition, etc.?  
Overwhelming evidence suggests that income inequality is on the rise in 
the United States, hitting levels not seen since the early 20th century. The top 1% 
of families take in 22.5 % of all pretax income while the bottom 90% are receiving 
below 50% for the first time in the history of the United States. [102] Political 
inequality is also a pressing issue for the legitimacy and efficacy of American 
democracy. Policy outcomes have been shown to respond to the political 
opinions of the rich while ignoring the preferences of the poor. [103] Social 
stratification and histories inequalities have created unequal channels for 
economic and political participation, while segregated demographics, educational 
disparities, and unequal application of law institutionalize the marginalization of 
individuals based on gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age, and income. By 																																																								
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redefining the link between inequality and decision making, evolutionary 
psychology shows that inequality is more than a threat to our democracy; 
inequality detracts from our basic desires to seek safety, community, and social 
worth while contributing to a vicious cycle of action patterns than serve to keep 
those of low-economic status trapped by societal constraints. Life history theory 
proves to be a productive method of analysis in understanding the insidious 
relationship between inequality and our evolved social functions.  
 
Life History Theory  
 
 A traditional choice model might predict logical decisions like investing in 
education, saving money, and waiting to start a family down the road as rational 
means of escaping poverty. However, evidence shows that people in lower 
socioeconomic positions tend to save less, pursue fewer educational 
opportunities, have children at a younger age, and take more risks. [104] What 
can explain this widespread deviation from self-interest? 
 Life history theory is a useful tool to examine the link between inequality 
and behavior. This theory is rooted in general evolutionary theory and based on 
the premise that organisms allocate resources over a lifespan in order to 
increase fitness as determined by the various constraints placed on them by the 
environment. Questions of reproductive timing, risk taking, and life strategy are 
central to the fitness of all organisms and evolution has provided numerous 																																																								
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psychological mechanisms to deal with these fundamental questions. [105] [106] In 
this model, there are trade-offs associated with different life strategies and 
decision making is marked on a slow-to-fast continuum. Fast strategies involve 
taking increased risks in hopes of short-term gain, often in a response to harsh 
environments because these kinds of contexts signal a greater risk of early 
mortality. Organisms who perceive their surroundings to be hostile could 
increase their fitness by reproducing quickly and capitalizing on short-term 
opportunities. On the opposite side of the spectrum, individuals who have reason 
to think that conditions will get better in the future are more likely to choose slow 
strategies that are more risk averse. [107] These individuals perceive their lives as 
trending upward, and the possibility of a better future incentivizes them to commit 
themselves to a longer-term strategy for future fitness.  
 To assume that those occupying a low-socioeconomic position make poor 
decisions because they are dumb, lazy or incapable is to mischaracterize the 
influence of environmental impact. People react with strong context-sensitive 
feelings towards their observed social role and perceived likelihood of 
improvement, and this interacts with evolved motivational mechanisms in 
consequential ways. It is not as if individuals consciously choose between fast or 
slow strategies, rather evolution has selected for underlying response 
mechanisms that motivate certain behavioral patterns in relation to relative 
status, current environment, and prediction of future conditions.  																																																								
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 Our evolutionary tendency to calculate tradeoffs based on environmental 
inputs may lead individuals to react to negative stimuli in a harsh socioeconomic 
environment. Cross-cultural studies have shown that in environments that are 
riskier, have fewer resources, and have a higher level of mortality people are 
prone to have children earlier, make impulsive decisions, and ultimately take 
more risks. [108] [109] Daly and Wilson provide powerful empirical data to support 
the correlation between inequality and social ills. In studying the relationship 
between homicide rates and inequality, they found that the Gini coefficient and 
homicide rates are positively correlated across US states, Canadian provinces, 
and all OECD countries. [110] 
 People tend to base their economic success on comparisons to others, 
not on absolute wealth. In one experiment, participants were given the choice 
between living in society A or society B. In society A, your current yearly income 
is $50,000 while the yearly income of others is $25,000. In situation B, your 
yearly income is $100,000 while the yearly income of others is $200,000. The 
majority of people said that they would prefer to live in society A despite the 
difference in absolute wealth. This demonstrates the importance of intrasocietal 
comparison as people base their status on comparisons to those around them.  
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 Inequality also relates back to the previous discussion of stress and 
obesity. Social inequality contributes to physical stress, leading the body to 
assume that resources are scarce. Stemming from the conditions of an 
evolutionary environment, psychological mechanisms to combat resource 
scarcity trigger an increase in appetite and amplified fat storage in the abdomen 
in an effort to hoard caloric resources. Empirical evidence is consistent with this 
claim, showing that rates of obesity are positively correlated with inequality. [111] 
 Harsh environments may have incentivized risk in the absence of long-
term incentives. Violence and early reproduction may have proven to be effective 
strategies for coping with harsh conditions and social inequality in ancestral 
environments. Although there is a certain level of risk involved in being more 
violent or having children at an earlier age, on a large enough scale these 
decisions would have proved beneficial to those at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy. What traditional theories may see as irrational behavior actually seems 
rational from an evolutionary perspective.  
 Despite this, the naturalistic fallacy insists that an evolutionary origin does 
not equate to justification of a behavior. In addition, mismatches between evolved 
response tendencies and current conditions may make our predisposed 
tendencies maladaptive to modern society. Clearly, “faster” strategies have 
negative effects on low-socioeconomic communities. In terms of policy 
development, this stark analysis shows that a primary facet of dealing with 
inequality includes increasing opportunity and giving people a reason to hope for 																																																								
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the future. Social policy may need to go beyond the provision of basic needs in 
order to motivate beneficial behaviors. These may seem like an idealistic and 
abstract goal, but they can be traced back to the theoretical and empirical 
framework of evolutionary theory and life history analysis. 
 
Welfare Policy and Evolved Influences  
 
Social exchange is dominated by reciprocity, and selection pressures 
have allowed for the development of keen cheater-detection systems that 
supplement our capacity to judge whether or not someone should be considered 
trustworthy. These mechanisms are far from perfect, but their gradual evolution 
provided a fitness boost on a collective level. Our definition of human beings as 
conditional cooperators conveys the importance of perceptions in guiding social 
behavior. If people perceive others to be reciprocal and honest cooperators, they 
are much more likely to cooperate than if they perceive other individuals as being 
lazy, unappreciative, or a burden on those that are contributing resources to a 
particular social arrangement. The predictive assessment is rather simple; if 
others are perceived as uncooperative, then people are less likely to cooperate 
themselves.  
The psychological mechanisms of cheater detection have been shown to 
be a powerful force in “shaping opinions about the most sophisticated modern 
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group-wide exchange system: the welfare state.” [112] Opinions on welfare seem 
to be associated with judgments of the reciprocity of these exchanges. Simply 
put, people are more likely to support a welfare system if (1) they are likely to 
gain from it or (2) they see the value in distributing resources and acknowledge 
that this exchange will prove to be beneficial in some way.  
 At its most basic level, the debate over welfare policy revolves around 
responding to requests for help. This triggers our cheater-detection stimulus and 
altruistic motivations. [113] What is most interesting in the case of welfare policy, 
is that most individuals agree with the basic concept of helping those that in a 
lower economic position. Opinion polls show that both liberals and conservatives 
from different political systems are equally supportive of providing assistance to 
reciprocators and equally likely to reject welfare to cheaters based on their 
perception of the recipient. [114] However, conservatives and liberals differ in the 
decoupled stereotypes they hold about the recipients of welfare policy. [115] This 
variation in the perceived conditions of reciprocation influenced support or 
opposition to welfare policy.  
 Americans and Europeans seem to have divergent views on welfare 
policy, with those in the US expressing less support for downwardly distributed 																																																								
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initiatives. One cross-cultural study concluded that the difference in welfare 
opinion does not occur at a moral level, but in the perceptions of the poor and the 
trust extended to those in a lower socioeconomic class. Europeans and 
Americans seem to hold similar attitudes towards the importance of welfare 
policy, but they have profoundly different attitudes towards the cooperative 
capacity of the poor. In the study, 60% of Europeans believed that the poor are 
trapped in poverty, while only 29% of American expressed this belief. 54% of 
Europeans think that luck determines incomes as compared to 30% of 
Americans. Additionally, 26% of Europeans believe that the poor are lazy as 
opposed to 60% of Americans. It is also important to note that the level of social 
mobility is relatively equal in both American and Europe.  
Psychological tools for judging reciprocity may be mismatched to the 
abstract generalizations that characterize mass politics today. The process by 
which we perceive trustworthiness through mass media channels and large-scale 
politics is fundamentally different than in ancestral conditions. Calculations of 
fairness are very different in a modern context, and this has profound 
consequences for politically malleable structures for resource exchange. Racism, 
xenophobia and socio-economic stereotyping may very well stem from a 
proclivity to be weary of trusting outsiders, and these in-group/out-group 
perceptions could be amplified by political messages aimed at building coalitional 
strengthen. There is some evidence that demographic variation also influences 
welfare opinion. “Differences in size and racial heterogeneity across countries 
are major causes of differences in the size of welfare states, with more 
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heterogeneous countries having smaller welfare states. [116] The limitations of 
this project only allow me to focus on a fraction of the inequality debate, but this 
demonstrates the permeating capacity of evolutionary psychology to shed light 
on issues of inequality and power imbalances.   
 
Status-centered development? 
  
 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of social status in influencing 
human behavior. As a primary determinant of reproductive success and resource 
acquisition, status is innately tied to a sense of purpose and belonging. Social 
exclusion activates the same neural networks as physical pain. [117] This sort of 
coalitional rejection signals social scarcity, a potent environmental risk in an 
ancestral environment. A lack of social support increases stress [118] and 
numerous studies have shown that more egalitarian societies are ‘happier’ 
places to live. [119] The most powerful predictor of many social ills may not be 
absolute level of income, but social inequality. [120]   
 Studies have shown that nations with low levels of trusts tend to have 
lower GDPs [121] and people tend to help others less in when trust is low. [122] 																																																								
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Income level is conventionally seen as the engine of well-being, and increasing 
GDP is championed as a value-neutral approach to bettering people’s lives. The 
free market allows people to determine how to appropriate resources according 
to their own interests. However, touting economic prosperity as a panacea to 
social problems is deeply out of touch with the realities of the evolved mind. 
Money is a modern construct, and holds little inherent value beyond its potential 
to increase status and acquire resources. Social relationships likely have a 
greater impact on happiness than economic position. One study concluded that a 
one-third drop in income reduces happiness by 2 points, while being widowed, 
divorced, or separated reduces happiness by 4. 5, and 8 points, respectively. [123] 
 Money cannot buy friendship, children, or security, and in many cases, a 
high salary comes at the expense of these ultimate ends. [124] What is most likely 
to bring about happiness is the fulfillment of goals that were important in an 
evolutionary context, [125] and placing money in front of community, family, and 
social worth inhibits a more expansive notion of wellbeing. “The main argument 
typically presented in favor of equality is based on considerations of social 
justice. The evolutionary and psychological approach suggests that there is 
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another, more neutral argument in favor of equality, which is that most people, 
rich and poor, would be better off in a more equal and less stressful society.” [126]   
 Unequal power dynamics isolate, frustrate, and ignore the needs of 
particular individuals, leaving them without a role in society. The evolutionary 
perspective gives credence to this subjective experience by taking into account 
the effect of social inequality on evolved psychological mechanisms.  
 A lack of role models in poor, often minority, neighborhoods may create a 
dearth of social signalers. Without a tangible vision of what life can be, what hope 
is there in thinking that your situation can change? Social inequality rips away at 
the very fabric of a democratic society by destroying social cohesion. Persistent 
and institutionalized social discrepancies feed into an insidious feedback loop as 
social exclusion operates within the context of our evolved mental mechanisms. 
Inequality is a cause, not just a symptom of inequality. [127] Evolutionary 
psychology presents a new argument for intuitive change, one that can be used 
by social scientists, community builders, and anyone interested in living in a 
happier, healthier world. 
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Conclusion: Applications and Constraints 
 
“Classical economics, Marxism, psychoanalysis, learning theory, instinct 
theory, cognitive theory, structuralism, artificial intelligence, neural network 
modeling, chaos and complexity theory, sociobiology – not a single one false in 
its essence, but each one false in its ambitions and especially in its 
condemnation of the others. A good textbook of human behavioral biology, which 
we will not have for another fifty years, will look not like Euclid’s geometry – a 
magnificent edifice of proven propositions derived from a set of simple 
assumptions – but more like a textbook of physiology or geology, each solution 
grounded in a separate body of facts and approached with a group of different 
theories, all the solutions connected in a great, complex web.” 
- Melvin Konner,  
The Tangled Wing (2003) 
 
The pursuit of knowledge is divided into several separate, yet interrelated, 
methods of seeking truth. Descriptive statements seek to explain “what is” in 
terms of non-valued, empirical facts. Causal analyses in evolutionary psychology 
likewise attempt to elucidate mechanisms, formal characteristics, developmental 
background, deep origins, and functions, again in a value-neutral manner. 
Normative arguments, in contrast, are value-oriented, as they aim to describe 
“what ought to be.” Distinguishing between the descriptive, causal, and normative 
roles of evolutionary psychology in understanding social and political behavior, 
and in shaping political policies, will allow for an epistemological framework that 
provides greater clarity as to the usefulness of applying an evolutionary 
perspective to political science.  
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My conclusions will articulate a preliminary structure for understanding the 
practicality and limitations of using evolutionary theory to conceptualize social 
behavior and inform policy conclusions. This framework is far from perfect, but it 
serves as a basic demonstration of a much-needed philosophical debate. The 
scope of this thesis does not serve as an adequate platform for articulating these 
ideas with the precision, nuance, and completeness that they deserve. But I have 
done my best to describe a personal impression of how evolutionary ideas 
should be used in the social sciences. This is itself a normative pursuit, and 
these ideas stem very much from my personal beliefs on the matter. The 
conclusions of this project are in many ways an armistice in my struggle to 
supplement conventional social science with the conceptual tools of evolutionary 
psychology. The following section will look to demonstrate the descriptive value, 
prescriptive utility, and normative limits of applying evolutionary psychology to 
social behavior.  
 
Descriptive value and causal understanding 
 
 What I have tried to demonstrate in the preceding sections is that 
evolutionary approaches, in general, and evolutionary psychology in particular, 
provide a unique descriptive value and casual understanding in their appraisal of 
human behavior. Evolutionary approaches contain the primary virtues of scientific 
exploration: they explains observed facts; they allow for new predictions; and 
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they provide “guidance to important domains of scientific inquiry.” [128] The value 
of the evolutionary perspective in explaining social and political behavior is based 
on three key characteristics of this approach: fertility, verifiability, and 
predictiveness.  
The “fertility” value of evolutionary psychology refers to the countless 
opportunities for applying this perspective to the study of human behavior. 
Evolutionary theory is often able to explain more with less, complement other 
levels of analysis, and offer new conceptions of our social identity that affect the 
study of social phenomena at all levels of analysis. Our understandings of party 
affiliation, media influence, and ideological preferences can all be informed by 
evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary approaches illuminate the psychological 
mechanisms that influence behavior on an individual level, while allowing us to 
see how these mechanisms have been shaped over our deep history by the 
context of small-scale social groups. Evolutionary psychology enriches our 
understanding of how culture affects behavior, but it also serves to enlighten the 
origins of culture itself. It provides insight into how political institutions have 
become embedded in our world, and describes the mechanisms by which we 
perceive political life. The evolutionary perspective helps us understand self-
interest as well as generosity, and social cooperation as well as coalitional 
violence. It may help to explain racism and xenophobia while simultaneously 
informing our knowledge of how to bridge cooperative divides.  
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In relation to inequality, evolutionary psychology helps us understand the 
root patterns of social exclusion that occur as a result of widespread inequality. 
This approach finds commonality through recognizing the existence of “human 
nature.” Critics of evolutionary psychology may argue that the discipline presents 
a cold, mechanical picture of what it means to be human. On the contrary, 
recognizing the ubiquities of human nature creates a more complete 
understanding of the experiences that we share in common. It builds bridges 
across needs, desires, and emotions that is not possible through a blank slate 
conception of the mind.  
 The conclusions of evolutionary psychology are verifiable (testable), in the 
sense that they can be tested (subject to limitations in methodology and quality of 
evidence, as is true in any science) against empirical observations. As previously 
discussed, evolutionary ideas are grounded in theory but tested through the 
collection and analysis of empirical data. The conclusions of evolutionary 
psychology are testable, and can be supported or refuted by evidence. The third 
facet of the evolutionary approach is predictiveness, as evolutionary analyses 
can inform cases beyond the situation from which they are derived. In 
understanding the evolved history of psychological mechanisms, we are able to 
extrapolate on how these proclivities will interact in a given situation. Human 
beings are conditional cooperators, in that they tend to cooperate in the presence 
of certain social factors. As formerly stated, human beings act in predictable 
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ways, we are predictably dumb and predictably selfish. [129] Our minds interact 
with social and environmental factors in producing behavior, and this allows us to 
make calculations on how exogenous variables may affect human behavior.  
 
Prescriptive Utility   
 
 The final characteristic, predictiveness, leads to the second principle of the 
epistemological framework: prescriptive utility. This represents the possibility of 
using evolutionary psychology to inform policy decisions and understand policy 
outcomes. Evolutionary psychology can help describe the types of policy actors 
humans tend to be, and the types of policies that are most likely to work. By 
incorporating the predictive capacity of evolutionary science in our thinking about 
policy, we gain a valuable tool in prescribing policies that are most likely to be 
effective.  
 This is the idea of using human nature as a lever for action. [130] With 
evolutionary approaches and insight it is possible to design incentive structures 
that tap into the predispositions of the brain, easing the process of manipulating 
human behavior through policy. This idea of prodding decision making may seem 
dystopian, but isn’t the purpose of all social policy to encourage or dissuade 
certain behaviors? Evolutionary theory provides an avenue to ground policy in 
something more than mere ideological commitment. There are significant costs 																																																								
129  Peterson, M.B. (2016) Evolutionary Political Psychology. In Buss, D. (Ed.) The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology. Vol. 2. John Wiley and Sons.  
130 Buss, D. (2015) Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind. 5th ed. Pearson 
Education. 
	 	 	 	 	 C.	F.	Burger	82			 	 	 	 	
	
associated with our current system of policy making. Assuming that every 
individual is completely malleable comes with obstacles that come to light 
through the lens of evolutionary psychology. 
 In the Life of Galileo, Bertolt Brecht writes that “the chief cause of poverty 
in science is imaginary wealth. The pursuit of science is not to open the door to 
infinite wisdom, but to set some limit on infinite error” [131] [132] There are 
profound limits to using human nature to understand the political and social 
world, but there are also enormous potential benefits. In the same way, ignoring 
the reality of our evolved condition is to leave us vulnerable to unrealistic and 
ungrounded philosophies that wishfully ignore the influence of millions of years of 
context-driven biological change. Adding an evolutionary lens to our scrutiny of 
our social identity allows us to see a clearer picture of human tendencies and the 
ubiquities that govern the human condition. Examining policy and social issues 
with an evolutionary perspective in mind brings descriptive value, in that it leads 
to novel conclusions of causation and environmental interaction.  
 The evolutionary perspective also has a heuristic discovery value, allowing 
us to ask questions we might not have otherwise asked. This, in turn, provides 
prescriptive utility, which involves using evolutionary conclusions to predict 
human behavior in relation to contextual circumstances. The final question 
concerning the usefulness of an evolutionary approach in thinking about the 
social sciences is how it can be used to build normative conclusions and inform 
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value assessments. It is in these normative pursuits that evolutionary theory 
warrants limitation, or in the very least extreme caution.   
 
Normative limits  
 
The need for normative debate arises from the visceral significance of the 
subjects involved. Politics is the prioritization of resource interests in accordance 
with power and ideals, and the methods used to study these dynamics can have 
potent effects on the conclusions reached. Political science is an exercise in 
understanding interactions between power, authority, and individual behavior. 
The arguments that stem from this undertaking have the potential to manipulate 
the manifestation of social control. Combining the social sciences with an idea as 
powerful as evolutionary theory is to position an ideological leviathan in a seat of 
immense authority.  
What this debate demands is an explicit justification for the 
epistemological methods used in combining our evolved identity with an 
investigation of political conclusions. Any sort of intellectual pursuit of socio-
political answers should present a candid discussion outlining the specifications, 
implications, and limitations of the chosen approach. This is not what I will 
achieve in this thesis, but it is ultimately the discussion that I wish to initiate. 
There is a need for an epistemological foundation for using evolutionary 
perspectives in the social sciences, in descriptive and explanatory terms, and to 
inform normative strategies. To what extent should we implement the descriptive 
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value of our evolved identity? Should we formulate policy based on the 
prescriptive utility of evolutionary conclusions? How can we justify using 
evolutionary findings in producing a normative vision of the world?  
  As mentioned briefly before, the naturalistic fallacy is the idea that one 
cannot conclude what is morally good by describing what exists, or is functional 
in the natural world. Because human males have an evolved predisposition 
towards violence in a range of contexts, this does not mean that this violent is 
warranted in a value-based society. Despite the widespread understanding and 
recognition of the naturalistic fallacy in mainstream evolutionary psychology, 
there are some who wish to reject or modify the argument in favor of strict 
naturalism.  
 Some scholars, mostly from the scientific community, have argued for a 
complete overhaul of how we go about answering normative questions. Paul and 
Patricia Churchland are two neuro-philosophers who express an open apathy for 
the “old fort” of what they call “folk psychology.” [133] This is their collective term 
for philosophical traditions that operate outside of the naturalistic perspective, 
which basically includes all traditional moral philosophies. They champion moral 
realism, or the existence of objective moral facts. For them, evolutionary 
psychology and neuroscience provide a gauge by which to determine the 
morality of an action based on how it affects cognitive responses. They claim that 
“legislatures can now overcome the archaic institutions of society and folk 
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traditions and base their propositions on this new understanding of human 
society and the way that it interacts with the minds of individual.” [134] Churchland 
claims that his vision promotes a “brave new world of public policy and the 
prospective of major cognitive growth for entire societies.” [135] What Churchland 
does not account for, is that he will have to first convince the public and political 
elites that this approach is valuable.  
In a review of Roger D. Master’ The Nature of Politics, Heiner Flohr 
convincingly responds to an analogy used by Masters as an attempt to cast aside 
the naturalistic fallacy as an impediment to evolutionarily-informed political 
progress. [136]  
“But when the doctor prescribes a treatment, we don’t 
normally object that this practice bridges the logical 
distinction between the facts of diagnosis and the 
value of health. When the physician says a patient 
ought to have an operation because the facts show 
appendicitis, the patient is unlikely to complain about 
a fallacious logical deduction.” [137] 
 
Masters is trying to argue that when evolutionary theory demonstrates a 
disconnect between evolved tendencies and social policy, there is no reason to 
impede social change by holding fast to the stubbornness of the naturalistic 																																																								
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fallacy. For example, Masters might argue that we have every reason to act upon 
our conclusions (if he believes them to be true) in changing social policy to 
decrease inequality because those conditions have been shown to interact 
negatively with our evolved psychology. According to Masters, one can cure the 
symptoms of social ills by following the prescriptions of evolutionary theory. 
However, this analogy is misleading because the doctor and patient 
proceed from an “unspoken assumption of the value of maintaining or 
reestablishing health.” [138] The doctor and the patient agree that health is a value 
worth pursing, and thus the patient should follow the doctor’s advice because 
he/she is in a informed position to make a diagnosis. In politics, values are far 
from agreed upon.  
“Scientific knowledge can have the effect of setting 
limits for the effective range of political possibilities. 
The same is true for the pragmatic setting of political 
goals and values, whether in a fundamental sense or 
in a contemporary context. In most actual situations, 
there is more than one sensible possibility. Scientific 
findings have a great, though limited value. They do 
not render irrelevant the ‘ultimate decisions’ people 
must make, for example, in favor of more freedom to 
the detriment of justice or vice versa. There is less 
value consensus here than in the doctor patient 
relationship.” [139] 																																																								
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Evolutionary psychology is a descriptive tool that provides ontological information 
that is relevant to the study of social science, but this ontological relevancy does 
not forfeit the declaration of values to a completely naturalistic epistemological.  
In reflecting on the conclusions concerning inequality, the discussion 
seems to have crossed the divide between a description of social behavior and a 
normative argument for greater equality. Calling for a more equal society under 
the auspices of evolutionary conclusions transfers the evolutionary approach into 
a normative realm of political thought. The fine line between what is and what 
ought to be is exactly where the most potent conversations of the evolutionary 
synthesis begin.  
In the case of inequality, the conclusions appear innocuous. Formulating 
an argument for an egalitarian society is far from novel in mainstream political 
science. But this conclusion is unique in that the premises are informed by 
evolutionary psychology and an explicit reliance on human nature. Conventional 
political science goes about acquiring knowledge by studying demographic 
composition, behavioral patterns, policy outcomes, institutional arrangements, 
and public opinion. Nowhere in this approach is a belief in predisposed 
characteristics of the mind. One might form a hypothesis on previous literature or 
observational patterns, but these notions are mostly derived from empirical data 
from within the social sciences. Adding an evolutionary perspective complicates 
the matter substantially by introducing a field based on different principles of 
observation, standards of evidence, and normative procedures.  
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For the sake of this discussion let’s accept the notion that society should 
be more equal because this would bring about greater overall happiness and 
deter undesirable behaviors because it would change the interactions between 
social inputs and evolved psychological mechanisms. Even if we accept the 
methods used to arrive at this conclusion, there are consequential questions of 
value-prescription that are raised in regard to this normative assessment.  
This conclusion on inequality aligns with the tenets of liberalism, but what 
about those on the opposite side of the political spectrum? Does the evolutionary 
evidence invalidate the legitimacy of conservative ideals? Do we value 
contentment over competition? Happiness over production? In the view of 
Churchland or Masters, there is no legitimate argument against the evolutionary 
evidence. There is a strict reliance on utilitarianism in the views of the normative 
evolutionary theorists. Would you be justified in to shaping your ideology around 
evolutionary ideas? Is this a legitimate basis for deciding how to vote, make 
policy, or structure laws? How do we implement evolutionary findings and ideas 
into pre-established value systems, or conversely, how do we argue against the 
normative policy implication of evolutionary evidence?  
If we argue for a change that brings policy closer to an evolved tendency, 
does this line of reason transfer to other traits? What about cases of male 
aggression, sex differences, or homosexuality? Each one of these issues 
requires a separate appraisal of the usefulness of evolutionary theory in shaping 
our political opinions. There are no obvious answers to any of these questions. 
What is clear, however, is that using evolution in constructing normative political 
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statements requires the same sort of justification that we require from any other 
value system. We ultimately have to account for the moral validity of the values 
to which we subscribe.   
 
Concluding thoughts  
 
In keeping with the stated intent of this paper, I hope to have inspired a 
more open discussion of using evolutionary theory and approaches in the social 
sciences. The previous sections of this thesis were meant to serve as a 
compilation of potentially useful applications of evolutionary theory in 
understanding social behavior. I also aimed to clarify the principle components of 
evolutionary psychology in an effort to break down a hostile barrier between 
social scientists and evolutionary biologists. If any part of the previous discussion 
sparked an interdisciplinary idea, corrected a misconception about evolutionary 
approaches, or provoked a meaningful critique then I would consider this project 
a success. My goal is to convey the importance of meaningful dialogue around 
this immensely important issue.  
“Those who are provoked need to work out why this 
topic is provoking. Hopefully they will be motivated to 
reassess some of their positions, causing an 
academic curiosity to seek out and investigate how 
evolutionary theory might be applied and the 
shortcomings. Evolutionary theory is generally 
accepted as the only scientific explanation of how 
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humans became humans, and is considered one of 
our greatest scientific discoveries.” [140]  
 
 Those in the social sciences should also be relieved that I never argued 
for a complete replacement of the discipline, but for a widened perspective and 
larger set of conceptual and empirical tools. Preserving the social sciences is to 
preserve the study of culture and society. The fluidity of values in contemporary 
politics requires a method of study that is specialized in understanding these 
trends. The social inputs that interact with psychological mechanisms can be 
conceived of as exogenous influences on individuals in society. It is the task of 
political science to pursue these ends.  
 “Hence in the context of mass politics, researchers 
cannot understand the formation of political 
judgments by just considering the structure of 
adaptions for politics. In addition, researchers need to 
direct the pathways – such as mental stimulations, 
medias stories, and political campaigns – through 
which ecologically valid information is (or fails to be) 
transmitted to those adaptions.” [141]  
 
I hope that the evolutionary theory of today is not the evolutionary theory 
of tomorrow. It is the charge of the evolutionary sciences to continuously rework, 
revise, and reformulate their understanding of human identity. It is my desire to 
see the relevancy of this thesis dwindle as research in both the social and natural 																																																								
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sciences converge to provide a clearer vision of both society and the individual. 
Evolution adds a wealth of intellectual prospects to the study of human behavior, 
as it open new avenues of exploration in the study of history, sociology, 
anthropology, and political science. 																																					
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